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ABST_CT
I,
_ mis re_rt presents _e results of a study of the statistics of
• E_rgen_ _cator Trans_tter (ELT) ala_s for N_A's Co_ications
_ Division (Code EC-4) me prima_ sources of data include ELT Incident
Logs, Service Difficulty Re_s, and Fr_uen_ Interference Re_rts.
--_ . me number of re.fred and _re_rted ala_s is discussed, as are seasonal
_ i variations, duration of ELT transmissions, and cost of silencing. Origin,| causes, and _ssible strategies for reducing the impact of ala_s on the
aviation co.unity are considered
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I Emergency Locator Transmitters (ELTs) are acceleration-triggered
emergency radio beacons intended to assist in locating aircraft crashes.
However, ELTs have demonstrated an excessive false alarm rate. On the
basis of incident records examined, at least 95 percent of _ii ELT alarms
m represent nondlstress situations.
I
Thi£ report examines ELT false alarms based on records collected
_ since the inception of the ELT program. The primary sources of informa-
m tlon were ELT Incident Logs collected at the Air Force Rescue and Coordi-
nation Center (AFRCC), Service Difficulty Reports (SDRs) collected by the
FAA at Oklahoma City, and Frequency Interference Reports (FIRs) submitted
• by Air Traffic Control Towers (ATCTs) and Flight Service Stations (FSSs)
to FAA Headquarters.I
t
' The number of reports of ELT alarms has decreased significantly since
" I 1975; however, indications are that this reduction may be attributable
_ J more to factors related to reporting efficiency than to an actual decrease
_' in the number of alarms. It is estimated that approximately 19,300 total
_ ELT false alarms occurred during 1978, of which only 22 percent, or 4,250,
_ were reported. The other 15,000 were terminated without any centralized
_ records being maintained of the incidents. The expected average of 6.5
simultaneous alarms is t'_ll under the expected capacity of the proposed
"|F search and rescue satellite _ARSAT).
" ELT false alarms exhibit seasonal variation of approximately ±20 percent
i I about the annual mean, occurring most frequently during spring and early
i _ summer and decreasing significantly during fall and winter.
_ Most ELT false alarms occur at airports and transmit, on the average,
_ I about three hours. Alarms at towered airports, which account for nearly
_ 45 percert of all false alarms, are silenced noticeably more rapidly than
_ _ those occurring at nontowered airports and off-alrport environments.
;_ _' Silencing is typically accomplished by local search and rescue crews, who
'_ _ _ will either disarm the unit themselves or request the owner to do so.
i r The cost of resources applied to silencing ELT false alarms is estimated
" _ at more than $2 million annually. Most of these resources are expended
_ by local governments and volunteers; however, the Federal Government
! |_ provides significant support in coordinating interstate search and rescue
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(SAR) operations. The most expensive alarms to locate and silence
originate at nontowered airports.
The primary causes of false alarms are related to technical diffi-
culties with the units' internal batteries and trigger mechanisms. Short
of replacing all units in the field, there appears to be no universally
effective solution to the present situation, although significant improve-
ments can be achieved within several years through a combination of
educational and administrative actions.
B:
, The recent Airworthiness Directive issued by the FAA concerning
lithium sulfur dioxide (Li-SO2) batteries is expected to reduce the number
of corrosion-induced false ala_'Tas by 37 percent. In addition, the most
promising strategy to alleviate the remaining problems experienced with
ELTs consists of the specific activities listed in Table S-I.
s
Table S-I. RECOMMENDED S_LUTIONS FOR REDUCING ELT FALSF ALARMS
Activity Benefit*
I
Review records for defecti_,e
trigger mechanisms Prepare detailed plan for
Survey ELT alarm reports to implementing corrective .
manufacturers actions
Distribute ELT alarm reports Encourage redesign of faulty
to manufacturers units "
Reduce false alarms by i0 -,
Develop ticketing procedure for percent ..)
offenders Reduce cost of SAR operationz
by 10 percent -_
!
• Provide daily reminders to pilots Reduce cost of SAR operations
by 5 percent
Encourage pilots to monitor emer- Reduce cost of SAR operations "_T
_ gency bands by 6 percent -_
Distribute direction-finding equip- Reduce cost of SARoperations -I
ment to SAR organizations by 5 percent i
Develop alternative triggering Reduce false alarms by 25
_, mechanisms percent -|
i: I Establish automatic ELT signal Reduce cost of SAR operations I
detector and notification capability by 3 percent
_. : at airports I
I
_. Develop and encourage use of standard Reduce cost of SAR operations -
ELT localizing procedure by 3 percent
!
*Benefits calculated on the basis of sources and causes of ELT trans- .I
j missions and estimated costs of locatin_ and silencing.
, ,i i
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I CHAPTER ONE
"' l INTRODUCTION
I
Emergency Locator Transmitters (ELTs) are self-contained radio beacons
i that are installed in most general aviation and military aircraft and are. designed to broadcast an emergency radio signal in the event of an aircraft
crash. The effectiveness of search and rescue (SAR) operations for
/
downed aircraft depends in part on the ability of SAR units to detect
I _d locate the crash site rapidly by homing in on transmissions from theELT installed in the downed aircraft.
I
l Although ELTs theoretically are a very valuable safety device, theyhave exhibited an excessive false alarm rate. In f_ct, it has been
estimated that more than 95 percent of all ELT signals detected repre-
sent false alarms. Each of these false alarm3 places unnecessary burdens
I on SAR operations by triggering unproductive search flights and divert-
ing resources away from true emergencies. In addition, the entire SAR
community has been demoralized by the psychological impact of these
I false alarms to the point where ELT signals frequently are not takenseriously.
I Therefore, to take full advantage of the possible benefits of ELTs,the number and duration of false transmissions must be minimized -- either
by developing a new generation of more effective ELTs or by improving the
efficiency of current SAR operating procedures. This report, preparedi
" _ f_r NASA's Communications Division (Code EC-4) under Contract NASW-3229,i
d_scribes the nature and extent of the false alarm problem. The report
also addresses the costs and benefits of changes to currept operating
I procedures, with the goal of reducing false alarms and better identify-
_ ing both distress and nondistress ELT transmission .
I.i BACKGROUND
_ The ELT is an inexpenslve device designed to broadcast an emergency
I 121.5 or 243.0 MHz radio signal automatically when triggered by a largedeceleration characteristic of an aircraft crash. ELTs have been used
on military aircraft since the mid-1950s; however, they have been
_ _ required on civil aircraft only since 1974.
I
2_
|
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Major problems with the ELT concept implementation began to surface
at the outset of the program. In 1970 Congress mandated the installation
of ELTs in most general aviation aircraft by 1 January 1974. Later, Con-
gress extended that deadline by six months to allow more time for retro- "
fitting existing aircraft. An estimated 140,000 ELTs were installed in
this initial period; since then, the market has been limited to 20,000
annual original equipment (OEM) installations in new aircraft and 5,000 ..
annual replacement units.
Many manufacturers, some with little avionics design experience
responded to accommodate the mandated demand. The rush to fill the
nonrecurring demand, coupled with the inexperience of many .,uppliers, .
resulted in significant technical and operational proble ', M,Iny of
these problems still remain. For example, the present _ ,':",_: gram ""
suffers from inadequate receiver coverage, ELT malfuncti, _s, _d ELT
misuse as follows:
• Ground coverage is limited by line-of-sight transmission
constraints.
' • Airborne coverage is accomplished voluntarily by general
aviation pilots.
• Accurate localization of signals is frequently limited to a
large area.
• Broadcasting may cease before the source is located.
• ELTs frequently fail to activate when crashes do occur•
• Only about three percent of all reported ELT broadcast_;
represent legitimate emergencies.
In the long term, the installation of a new generation of ELTs could
solve many of these problems, but retlofitting the aviation fleet with
new equipment would Le expensive and time-consuming. The r_adio Technical
Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) is currently developing a specifica-
tion for a second-generation unit. The specification is expected to
result in a new FAA Technical Standard Order (TSO) some time in 1983.
Even then, retrofitting of all existlng aircraft probably will not be
required. Therefore, alternative short-term solutions must be de'eloped
to improve the effectiveness of existing ELTs. Even without the benefit
of a new generation of improved ELTs, more acceptable monitoring of
emergency frequencies and _re rapid identification 8nd silencing of
ELT transmissions could improve the effectiveness of the current system.
NASA is supporting the application of search and re_cue satellites
< to enhance significantly the monitoring _ eL,,_rgency signals and to
: assist in the location and silencing of ELT transmJssions. The first
_t of these satellites, SARSAT, will provide national coverage at least
twice daily, beginning in 1982. SARSAT will be capable of receiving
and sorting up to about i0 ELT signals simultaneously while locating
each signal source to within an average radius of i0 kilometers. The
2
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instantaneous capacity and accuracy of the satellite will depend on the
_ geographic, spectral, and temporal distributic_n of ELT signals. Thus it
J is desirable to reduce the instantaneous number of ELT false transmissions
in order to minimize the possibility of overloading the satellite. Alter-
i ative_y, the same effect could be achieved through more rapid silencing
of detected false alarms.
I 1.2 PURPOSE
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the causes and character-
/ i istics of nondistress ELT transmissions and to develop a short-term
U strategy for minimizing their impact on search and rescue (SAR) operations.
Specifically, the objectives and effectiveness of this strategy may be
defined in terms such as reductions of instantaneous multiple alarm rates,
I igher ratio of true distress calls to false alarms, shorter SAR missions,
and lower costs of missions.
_ An ideal strategy is one that could be fully effective within three| years and yet involve only a minimal number of personnel. It would be ..
desirable not to burden aircraft owners with any additional "up front"
i expenses.
1.3 SCOPE _The short-term perspective of this study limits the s.t of possible
alternative strategies. For example, major technical perturbations to
either ELT or satellite design cannot be completed in less than fiveyears and therefor do not fall within the scope of this effort. Efforts |
" must be focused on developing administrative approaches that can be
implemented easily, effectively, and quickly so as to be fully operational
and effective within three years of adoption.
The statistics of the ELTpopulation have changed markedly since
I 19".'4and continue to change daily. Manufacturers' experience has| resulted in product modifications, customer preferences have altered
. the mixture of available models, and user perceptions of ELT effective-
ness have been tempered by personal experiences. Although the existence "of such trends in the aviation community cannot be ignored, this report
makes no attempt.to extrapolate these trends into the future. This
_ study uses 1978 snapshot data from a dynamically changing ELT environ-
I ment and implicitly assumes thau the characteristics of this "snapshot"
"_ will hold over a 5- to 10-year period. However, for the purpose of
evaluating the effectiveness of various alte.native strategies, careful
consideration h s been given to recent developments within the industry.
i There is an important distinction between a false alarm (non-
0
I distress transmission) and a missed alarm (failure to transmit after acrash). The latter problem is not a major focus of effort in this study.
! 1-3
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EELTs were assumed to be black boxes that exhibit specific definable
statistical characteristics. Proposed solutions are directed toward chang-
ing those statistics through administrative prgcedures rather th_ changing ._
the black boxes themselves. Hardware solutions involving internal changes
to ELT designs are, for the _ost p_rt, beyond the suope of this study. ..
Most ELT false alarms occur wz_hin the boundaries of the contiguous ""
48 states in the continental United States. The aviatioh community and
search and rescue operations in Alaska and Hawaii are sufficiently
different to require special consideration. _'or this _eason, and because _
the data sources for Alaska and Hawaii _re not collocated wzth the data
_ources for the rest of the country, Ala_ka and Hawaii were not examined. --
1.4 ORGANIZATION OF REPORT . I_
This report i_ divided into seven chapters covering four broad -"
topics. Chapter One presented the background, purpose, and scope of the _
study, and addressed some of the initial constraints imposed on the
effort. Chapter Two addresses the mechanics of search and rescue opera-
* tions and how they affect the search for ELTs. Chapter Three describes
the available sources of data and summarizes the procedures used to .-
collect these data.
Chapter Four presents the statistics of the false alarm reports
compiled in the data sources described earlier. However, many ELT
alarms are not reported; therefore, the statistics presente@ in Chapter
Four represent only a sample of the total nu:_ber of ELT false alarms.
Chapter Five, therefoze, develops estimated statistics for the total
population of ELT false alarms, reported and unrepozued. It is important
to note that the same parameters are discussed in Chapters Four and Five,
but their values are different because Chapter Four describe: only a
sample of the total universe of ELT alarms addressed in Chapter Five.
Chapters Six and Seven are discussions of corrective action strategies
that might be used to solve the ELT false alarm problem. The effective-
hess of these strategies is evaluated on the basis of total ELT alarm
estimates developed in Chapter Five. Chapter Six evaluates the relative •
priorities, goals, and approaches for corrective action relative to the
false alarm problem. Chapter Seven provides conclusions and recommenda-
tions for specific implementation plans that would alleviate the false
._larm problem.
_ A bibliography is presented in the appendix.
1-4
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I CHAPTER TWO
b
: J • SEARCH AND RESCUE OPERATIONS
!
!,
This chapter addresses the mechanics of search a_ rescue operations
I and the technical performance characteristics of ELTs. The division of
• search and rescue responsibil_ :ies is discussed first. Search and rescue
operations with respect to ELTs are described and a standard scenario is
D developed. This chapter also examines the historical perfon,_ance of ELTs
I and the problems that have emerged relative to _e original objectives
of the program.
:! {2.1 OVERVIEW i
!" • The current National Search and Rescue Plan has divided federal
l emergency assistance responsibilities into three Search and Rescue (SAR)
jurisdictions -- the Inland, Maritime, and Overseas Regions, shown in
i Figure 2-1. The U.S. Air Fc_r_ Rescue Coordination Center (AFRCC) (locatedat Scott Air Force Base, Illinois) is responsible for cooralnating federal
• SAR efforts in the Inland Region. This same function is performed by
the U.S. Coast Guard in the Maritime Region and by the appropriate military
overseas unified command in the Overseas Region. The Inland Region is of
_ particular interest to this study because Jt encompasses the continental
United States, from which the vast majority of ELT alarms originate.
I 2.1.1 Search and Rescue Responsibilities in the Inland Region
:_ m State and local authorities are primarily responsible for the
'_ I successful accomplishment of SAR operations. However, there are sub-
_._ stantial variations in the attitudes, structures, capabilities, and
_ facilities of and local search andstate SAR programs. Generally most
" rescue efforts are manned and organized through the local sheriff, fire,
and police departments, and volunteer organizations such as the Civil Air
_ Patrol. State officials are responsible for coordinating intrastate
_ , efforts that involve these different organizations and for requesting 'i
•_ l federal SAR assistance through the AFRCC if needed
The relationships between these state and local jurisdictions and
I the Federal Government are '_ased on legal agreements between the respec-
_ tive states and the AFRCC. Some states, particularly in the west, take ._
_ ! 2-1
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I
full responsibility for their SAR efforts, while others prefer to let
the AFRCC assume control.
" The success of SAR operations, especially with respect to distressed
J aircraft, depends on assistance received from the entire aviation community.Private pilots, although not required to listen for ELT sign ls, freque tl
report or assist in their searches. In fact, more than 90 percent of the
distress signals detected are first reported by private pilots on _ersonal
I or pleasure flights.
2.1.2 Emergency Rescue Operations
J
I Most fixed-wing aircraft in the United States are required to carry
an Emergency Locater Transmitter (ELT) that will transmit a radio distress •
|I signal in the event of a crash. (Exceptions are listed in Section 2.2.)These signals are transmitted simultaneously on 121.5 and 243.0 MIIz, two
frequencies specifically allocated for emergency use. These bands are
monitored continuously by most air traffic control towers (ATCTs) and
I flight service stations (FSSs). Because of line-of-sight transmissionlimitations of these signals, a true distress signal from a downed air-
craft will probably not be detected by a ground receiver at ATCTs or FSSs.
I Those signals which a_e detecte] from the ground are usually either air-born or located in th imm diate vicinity of the ceiver.
Airborne signal sources are easily distinguished since the signal
strength will fade in a few minutes and many ground stations scattered
over a large area will detect the signal. Ground-based signal sources
that are detected by a ground receivel must De in the immediate vicinity
I of the receiver and are therefore handled locally if at all. Typically,
airport personnel will search the_ local area for the ELT, using direction-
finding (DF) equipment if avai]able._ This procedure, in almost all
cases, locates the ELT. If it does not, appropriate SAR resources are
! marshaled. Figure 2-2 illustrates a typica? rescue mission procedure.
In addition to the qround stations, military flight crews routinely|
I monitor 243.0 MHz and civilian pilots monitor 121.5 MHz volunta_'ilF.many
As a result, ELT signals are typically detecttd_ first by a pilot. When
a pilot hears an ELT transmission, he normdlly radios the nearest FAA
i I facility although he,is not required to do SO. The Air Traffic Controlstaff asks the pilot position, where th__ ELP w_s first and in. t heard,
/ and where the signal was the strongest. Thi_; information is then for-
warded to the nearest Air Route Traffic Control Center (A,,PCC), which
I serves as the focal point for FAA assistance to the SAR operation. ARTCC
staff are required to notify the AFRCC immediately.
I Once notified, the AFRCC a management role in locating the
assumes
signal .-n,_rce. The first report may have been received from high-
altitude (30,000 feet or higher) aircraft. Under these circumstances
I the ELT could be anywhere in an area as larqe as 300,000 square miles.T refore, the first st p the investigation is to localize the ELT to
I
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a smal_er area. Typically, the AFRCC asks the reporting ARTCC to solicit
[ additional pilot reports, particularly low-altitude reports, that cannarrow the search area. This process usually takes one o two hours.
t
? _ When the ELT has been localized to an area perhaps 60 miles in
I diameter, the AFRCC will solicit reports from ground stations in the
_ region. The stations may be unattended, particularly late at night; thus
[ no reports may be obtained or the reports may be negative. In thi_
[ situation, the AFRCC will open a mission, which denotes the marshaling
i _ of SAR resources to locate and silenze the ELT. No firm criteria exist
for opening a mission; each situation is handled on a case-by-case basis.
AFRCC next notifies the responsible state official that a mission has
i been opened. The official, in turn, authorizes an air or ground search,
or both, using either state resources or those of the Civil Air Patrol
(CAP).
,[
i" The CAP is an official auxiliary of the Air Force, although all CAP
: members are strictly unpaid volunteers primarily flying private aircraft.
[ High-wing aircraft, such as the Cessna 172, are particularly popular
i _ |, because they provide better ground vlsibility. Aircraft owners are
_ reimbursed by the Air Force only for the fuel they use; owners must bear
• [ all other operating costs associated with the mission. Direction-
_ finding (DF) equipment is used to locate the source of the ELT signal
from the air. Once it is located, further action depends on the cir-
cumstances of the case. If the ELT is localized to an airport, ground
Ii personnel take over. If the airport is unattended, as might be the
can
case after midnight, the CAP aircraft can land and search the airport on
foot. If the signal is traced to a populated area, local law enforcement
|- officials may be called upon to track down the ELT. Finally, if the
L signal is traced to a remote area, there is a strong possibility of an
• actual crash and local SAR teams are dispatched as appropriate.
I" Once the ELT signal has been traced to a specific nondistress air-
craft, attempts are made to silence the signal, which could be difficult
to do. Typically, officials try to summon the owner to disarm the ELT;
this approach minimizes potential liability problems. Alternatively,
the SAR crew will attempt to shut the ELT off, but they may be unsuccess-
ful because the switch may not be accessible or the unit may be stuck
( "on". In such cases the device can sometimes be neutralized by wrapping
I the antenna with foil. If all attempts fail, FCC assistance may be
requested to obtain legal authorization to break into the airplane and
disarm the ELT. Although a false alarm is a violation of FCC regulations
the FCC is seldom called into a case, and citations for an ELT false
alarm are rarely issued.
: I AFRCC scrutiny of the ELT incident continues until notification is
_ received that the ELT has been located or silenced and that necessary
rescue operations have been accomplished. If at any time during the
_ investigation the AFRCC receives several consecutive negative reports i
from the same vicinity in which the reports were originally heard, the
ELT is assumed to ha_., ceased and the investigation is closed.
, i
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2.2 DISCUSSION OF EMERGENCY LOCATOR TRANSMITTERS
2.2.1 Legal Requirement [
The Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970, Section 31, amended
the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 to require that Emergency Locator |
Transmitters (ELTs) be installed in all fixed-wing aircraft manufactured L
in the United States or imported after 31 December 1971. The following
aircraft were exempted: [
• Jet-powered aircraft
• Aircraft used in air transportation, other than air taxi and
charter service
• Military aircraft
• Aircraft used solely for training in flights of not more than ?]i];
20 miles
• • Aircraft used for the aerial application of chemicals "I
i
This law ultimately became effective 30 June 1974 and was implemented by
the FAA in an amendment to the Federal Aviation Regulations. Technical ]
Standard Order (TSO) C91 specified minimum performance standards for I
Emergency Locator Transmitters and referenced design standards and param-
I
eters described by the Radio Technical Committee for Aeronautics (RTCA)
as follows: l
• RTCA DO-145, "Minimum Performance Standards - Emergency Locator
Transmitters, Survival Type - ELT(s)", for use of portable
Emergency Position Indicator Radio Beacons (EPIRBs) for marine
• applications
• RTCA DO-147, "Minimum Performance Standards - Emergency Locator
Transmitters, Automatic Fixed - ELT(AF)*, Automatic Portable -
ELT(AP)*, Automatic Deployable ELT(AD)*, for crash-activated
; emergency radio beacons to be used in aircraft
2.2.2 ELT Specifications
ELTs of primary concern in this study are of the "AF" or "AP" type. "i
- Typically, they are self-contained, are less than 12 inches long on any )
-! one side, and weigh only a few pounds. They are triggered by a crash _I
_ sensor, which is usually an acceleration-sensing switch activated by a I I
force along one or more axes. Ii
<' *"AF" equipment is intended for permanent installation on the airframe; il
l"AP" equipment may be attached or portable; and "AD" equipment is abouyant ELT that is automatic:ally ejected from the aircraft and activated
when subjected to crash forces.
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Mounting of ELTs varies significantly by type, aircraft, and manu-
' [ facturer's make and model. It is most desirable to install an ELT by.z _ fastening it to a structural member of the airframe slightly aft of the
midsecticn of the fuselage. If it is mounted too far forward, there is
a significant risk of destruction; if it is mounted too far aft, the
unit may experience insufficient crash forces to trigger. The most
common practice in general aviation is to mount the ELT in or aft of the
baggage compartment.
On the basis of the experience gained by the aviation community
,._ since 1974, the original specifications are being reevaluated. The
i [ Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics, Special Committee 127, hasissued a preliminary specification for a second-.generation unit. Special
Committee 136 is considering the applicability of these specifications
[ with respect to other components of the ELT program. Table 2-I is acomparison of key ELT requir ments as they we e originally releasedthrough DO-147 and the most recently proposed specifications for the
second generation of ELTs.
, [
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Table 2-I. KEY ELT PARAMETERS
Function Per RTCA DO-147 Proposed Revision*
Local Controls On-off switch On-off arm switch
Remote (Cockpit) None On-off arm switch transmitter
Controls and "on" indicator, false alarm
Indicators reset
• Power Source Independent of Independent of aircraft supply; ill
aircraft supply battery gas or leak will not U
: degrade performance
.,
Antenna Mounting Omnidirectional Vertically polarized omnidirec- _I_"U
, aircraft external tional, aircraft external i I;
mounting mounting, locking, noncorrosive
rf cable connectors
Operating Frequencies 121.5 MHz, 243.0 121.5 MHz, 243.0 MHz, ±0.005 ,_I-
MHz, ±0.005 percent; carrier stability over
percent audio sweep cycle ±150 Hz
Modula£ion Amplitudemodu- An_litudemo_ulationfactor, "]',
I lation; modula- 0.85; >700 Hz down sweep between ]
tion factor, 1,600 and 300 Hz at 2 to 4 Hz
0.85; >700 Hz repetition rate
' down sweep between i'I "
1,600 and 300 Hz
at 2 to 4 Hz
repetition rate
--1
Modulation Duty Cycle 33 to 55 percent 33 to 55 percent I '-+
.I
Peak Effective Ratio >75 mW on each _75 mW per frequency average
Radiated Power frequency during 50 hours of transmission**
i1Operating Life 48 hours 50 hours
'_ Automatic Activation 5 +2,-0 g longitu- Inhibit below 2 ±0.3 g; activate
dinal for ii ms; if VV (_ × T) exceeds 3.5 ±0.5
stay latched ft/sec (e.g., at 5 g per 21.7 "]
during 50 g for ms or 20 g per 5.4 ms, etc.); I
: ii ms; alternate alternate sensor acceptable
sensor acceptable
l+ Crashworthiness -- Mounting to withstand 100 g
RFI -- Unaffected by 103 to 136 MHz
(no activation, no reradiation)
1TemperatureLow Storage -65°C -55°Ct
_ Low Operating -20°C -20°Ct
High Storage +71°C +_5°Ct
:_ High Operating +55°C +55°C%
Shock 50 g for 11 ms i00 g for 23 ms
I _+ Vibration 10 g maximum 7 g maximum (operating, no "I
nonoperating, activation permitted), 5 to i
_." 5 Hz to 2000 Hz 2000 Hz - |
'_ *Source: RTCA Paper No. I07-78/SC127-52, dated 24 May 1978. --|
**Note that calculation of "average" power has been changed. I
@Test method modified. -"
c.
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_ I CHAPTER THREE
• _ I DESCRIPTION OF INVESTIGATION
_' This chapter is a discussion of the general analysis procedures
"! 1 applied to this study. A work plan for the study is described, and amore detailed description of the methodology and a list of the data I
sources considered are provided. A detailed description of the three -
major data sources used in the study is presented, with each source
I characterized in terms of the quantity and quality of data collected,
coverage of incidents, and expected data accuracy.
• [ 3.1 PLAN OF INVESTIGATION
[ This investigation consisted of eight tasks arranged into three) major multi-task phases. In the first phase available statistical data .,
- on ELT incidents were compiled and analyzed. In the second phase
" specific goals and measures of performance were established for use in ;
evaluating plans proposed to reduce the false alarm _roblem. In thethird phase proposed programs were developed and analyzed against the
. _ criteria developed during the second phase.
:[_ 3.1.1 Phase I: Collect Data
_ The data used for the analyses in this study consisted of statistical
information concerning the nature of ELT incidents; qualitative background
material on the false alarm problem; and supporting information concerning
government, industry, and user community plans and desires. Supplementary
_ Ii information was obtained through literature review and interviews with
_ _ knowledgeable officials of the FAA, FCC, NASA, and various state and local
SAR organizations. The nonstatistical information sources were used
Ii ofmainlYthequantitativet°provide ananalysis.Understandingof the problem and to direct the scope
i The statistical data were derived by using a computerized data base
__, acquired from existing records of ELT incidents. Prime sources of
_ . information for statistical analyses were three independent record sets:
the ELT Incident Log maintained by the Air Force Rescue Coordination
= Center _AFRCC), the Frequency Interference Reports (FIRs) collected by
the Airways Facilities Division of the Federal Aviation Administration,
2
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and the Service Difficulty Reports compiled by the FAA Flight Standards
National Field Office in Oklahoma City. _]
The following additional data sources were considered but were
found to be of peripheral interest to this study:
U
• The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) maintains records _
on the causes of aircraft accidents and ELT performance in
crashes; NTSB does not, however, maintain any f les on ELT false .7
ala_s _nce no accident was involved.
• The National Civil Air Patrol (CAP) headquarters maintains some
records on ELT incidents, primarily when a CAP aircraft search "I
is launched. The CAP is not as interested when a nondistress I
ELT is located and silenced without its assistance. l
• State aviation agencies maintain records of ELT incidents in "I _!
their states. The level of detail varies from state to state. - _
• The Federal Communications Commission maintains records of
unusual situations involving a violation of FCC regulations,
such as nonemergency use of 121.5 MHz. The FCC is called in
on an ELT incident only as a last resort. The FCC was involved _--
in fewer than 70 ELT cases in 1978. Fines for unauthorized use
of the emergency frequency (i.e., an ELT false alarm) are
extremely rare.
3.1.2 Phase II: Establish Goals and Performance Measures
Data ccllected in Phase I made it possible to identify useful
measures of performance and the maximum savings possible from improve-
ments in false alarm performance. These measures and savings were -
estimated by calculating the percentage of total ELT transmissions by t
source and cause a**d estimating the cost of SAR operations for each
category of alarm. The analyses indicated that the efficiency of SAR _i
operations depended not only on the absolute number of ELT a]arms ,
detected but also on the procedure used to locate and silence these -
alarms A goals structure was developed to define quantitatively the •
results of changes to the status quo. This goals structure is addressed
in detail in Chapter Six.
The estimated cost of SAR operations per alarm was the key to per- _ •
forming cost-benefit analyses required to compare the utility of various!
J alternative strategies. The development of this measure of performance -_
required the application of standard scenarios and representative SAP I
procedures to estimate the costs involved in silencing ELT alarms. The
benefits of each approach were evaluated on the basis of reduction in
costs achieved. "i
,f
p
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!: 3.1.3 Phase III: Identify and Evaluate Possible Solutions
The objectives established in Phase II describe the impact of an
i improvement in the false alarm problem, but they do not describe how to
_ achieve that improvement, how much it will cost, and whether it will be
_! I cost-effective. This last phase of the study evaluated several proposed
implementation plans for cost and technical effectiveness with respect
to the different goals established in Phase II. Considerations in
_ developing plans included:|4:-
• New hardware requirements or modifications to existing hardware<,v
_ _ " Changes in regulations or required regulatory actions|
• Further demand for government services
• impact on pilots, FAA personnel, airport personnel, and SAR
crews
Each plan was evaluated on the basis of its cost to the parties
_ i involved and its effectiveness, political acceptability, and lead time
to implementation. The plans with the highest ratings were given more
a _ careful consideration to assure the accurate assessment of the possi-
,_ _ bilities of technical or regulatory delays, leoal complications, and
i noncompliance by the user communities.
_ 3.2 SOURCES OF DATA
: The three record sets that form the basis of the statistical analyses
: I presented in this report are discussed in the following subsections.
i
3.2.1 ELT Incident Lo_
,!: The U.S. Air Force Rescue Coordination Center (AFRCCj, headquartered
at Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, has been designated t le responsible
:, _ Federal organization for coordinating SAR activities _ , the continental
, _ United States. As part of its charter, the center maintains a complete
i record of all ELT incident histories in the form of ELT Incident Logs
reported from anywhere in the entire continental United States. Typically,
_, f the ELT Tncident Log includes the date of the inciden_, time detected,
_ i time of ELT shutoff, location, disposition, and, possibly, cause of the ELT
incident. Figure 3-i presents a sample ELT Incident Log.
, l_, Most of the reForts of ELT incidents originate from general aviation
pilots who monitor 121.5 MHz. The pilots typically report any ELT
_ signals they hear on the emergency frequencies to the n_arest FAA Flight
:_ & _ Service Station or Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC), which in
_ _ turn notifies the AFRCC of the incident.
I [ Although all incidents are required by law to be reported, many arenot reported. If an ELT alarm is resolved locally, in many cases no
_, FAA (and consequently no ARTCC) facility will hear of the incident;
, }
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therefore, the incident will probab:y not appear in the AFRCC records. Thus
_- the reporting rates vary dramatically from one ARTCC to ancther, depending• on the local procedures used to silence the alarm. The existing records
themselves are incomplete with respect to identification of location and
I_ cause since only about _0 percent o_ reported incidents are recorded as :being located and silenced. In thE. remaining reports, the ELT transmis-
sions cease before being locatea by the AFRCC-managed SAR team, or the unit
is shut off by someone not in communication with the AFRCC. AFRCC received
Ii approximately 13 of ELT incidents daily in 1978, for an annual total
reports
: of approximately 4,700 reports.
I- This situation underscores th,, major problem with the AFRCC records.
I. While the Air Force personnel are _ledicated and efficient, they receive
no first-hand infomaation; i.e., a 1 their data are transmitted second-
or third-hand over the telephone. SAR officials at the scene may failto inform the AFRCC of important d,_velopments in the case; at best, their
reports are delayed. (In Chapter "our, this delay is quantitatively
measured.) Nevertheless, the AFRO_ is the best source of nationwide
I" statistics on ELT incidents.
To limit data-collection effocts, a random sampling of 17 weeks'
" records from 1978 was used to develop the annual statistical measurespresented in this report. The we ks ran from Thursday to Wednesday to
assure capturing whatever weekday-weekend variance existed. Every fourth
| week was chosen as part of the sample, beginning with 12-18 January 1978.
1 One additional week each in March, June, September, and December was
randomly added to complete the sample. Some minor errors in transcription
were corrected. In particular, i_ was apparent that the change of the
Zulu day (6 p.m. Central Standard Time) versus the change of thecalendar day (at midnight) was a source of confusion.
I Much of the information in the log was a record of activities Ii
associated with localizing the signal and coordinating with loc_! SAR I
resources; neither of these was of direct interest. The following data :
were extracted for each incident:
I • AFRCC incident number. Could be used later to refer to a
specific incident.
• Date of incident (month and day). All incidents occurred in
1978.
t
• Reporting ARTCC. Most incidents are reported by an FAA Air
: Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC).
• City and state where ELT was found. Filled in only for those
. incidents in which an ELT was recorded as being located and
silenced.
_' • Time of initial report.
I • Time located. Filled in only if there was substantial
ELT was
difficulty in silencing the ELT once it was !_ca_ed. This could
occur, for example, if the aircraft was locked in a hangar.
J .
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• Time ELT was silenced. For those incidents in which ELT was
recorded as not found, the time of the closihg of the incident
would be used.
[
• Confirmed indicator, If the incident was detected independently
by at least two receivers, this box would be checkea.
• Found indicator. If the incident was recorded as located and
silenced, this box would k. checked.
• • Mission indicator. If the incident resulted in an AFRCC mission,
_ this box would be checked.
• Environment. If the ELT incident was recorded as located and
silenced, the environment where the unit was found would be
recorded. The possible environment codes correspond to towered
airports, nontowered airports, boats, nonaircraft, airborne
vehicles, fields, and legitimate czash sites.
Information concerning incidents that resulted in SAR missions was taken
from a separate missions data base, also obtained from AFRCC.
• 3.2.2 Frequen_ Interference Reports
The FAA Airways Facilities Service maintains a log of Frequency
Interference Reports (FIRS). A report is filed by a control tower _ATCT)
or a Flight Service Stat_en (FSS) whenever one of the aviation frequencies
is jammed. An ELT signal is considered to be _uch an occurrence. Each
reporting tower or FSS submits completed FIRs to the regional FAA head- i
quarters, which forwards the FIRs to national FAA headquarters.
FIRs usually contain details on the date, time on, time off, location,
and sometimes cause of interference, as well as the responsible equipment
make and model. These forms are maintained at the national FAA headquarters I '
by the Airways Facilities Division. Figure 3-2 shows a samp] ° FIR form.
Although FIRs must be filed upon detection of frequency jamming, only
the FAA Western Region fulfills this requirement conscientiously. For
example, of a total of 284 FIRs reviewed, only 9 were not from the Western ! _
: Region. The statistical validity of FIRs tends to be compromised by [
several other factors: _ ,
,|
_ Only about 50 percent (151) of the reports contain a,!equate cause i
and manufacturer's make and model information. ,
• FIRs tend to report only incidents that occur at or near airports, i
particularly towered airports and flight service stations. This
situation is a consequence of the fact that towered airports and T
FSSs are required to monitor 121.5 MHz. ! •
• FIR files are maintained for only about two years and cannot
prov4de insight into long-term trends. .} [_
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On the other hand, FIRs tend to provide much more accurate information
on transmission durations than the AFRCC data because the time-on/time-o_f
data are recorded by field personnel actually listening to the emergency [_ i
fzequency, rather than by someone who must rely on second- or third-hand I
information. No sampling was used in the statistical analysis of FIRs ,
because of the small number of records involved (251 in 1978). -. L
As in the AFRCC records, not all data contained in the FIRs were i.
extracted for analysis. The fields recorded were as follows:
i
• FKA region ! "
• City ard state :"
• Reporting organization code (here it was only necessary to :
record whether it was a tower, FSS, or ARTCC)
• Date
• Time ELT detected
• Time ELT silenced
• Manufacturer, if known
• Reason for the incident, if known
3.2.3 Service Difficulty Report s
Service Difficulty Reports (SDRs) are submitted directly to the FAA
Flight Standards N_tional Field Office in Oklahoma City whenever a mal-
function or an unexpected or unusual condition is noted in an aircraft
or aircraft subsystem during ground inspection, pre-flight preparation,
or maintenance. These reports are filed primarily by FAA inspectors,
airport personnel, and maintenance personnel. The filing of Se_-vice
Difficulty Reports is totally voluntary. The purpose of the program is
to detect design defects, maintenance-procedure flaws, and other
undesirable trends, and to }_rovide a statistical body of information on
which to base engineering evaluations of potential safety hazards.
SDRs usually provide an accurate technical summary of the unexpected
condition. Typical data on the form include manufacturer make, model, and
serial number; problem condition; and geographic origin of report. Each
_. report contains a summary of the problem encountered and its probable
cause.
,t
Many tens of thousands of SDRs h._ve been submitted to the Flight
Standards National Field Office since 1974. Summaries of these reports
have been integrated into a large computerized data base that is accessible
for sorting and readout according to _,any different parameters. Of this "
.... total data base, approximately 6,000 report summaries concern ELTs;
75 percent of the report summaries addross the failure of equipment to
operate properly, either in an inspection or in a crash. The remaining
1,500 reports concern fal_,e ,_larms. Figure 3-3 is an example of the
,!
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summary Service Difficulty Report tabulation available from the FAA Flight i
Standards National Field Office. Note the detailed information available
on make, medel, condition, and location.
For purposes of this study, only individual record summaries
related to ELT false alarms were extracted for analysis. (Undoubtedly "_
much useful information can be gained from the remaining records on ELT ._
reliability, but that is not a primary concern of this study.) Data
from the selected records on make and model and probable cause were
extracted, tabulated, and statistically analyzed. The results of these i
analyses are presented !_ Chapter Four of this report. "'
The statistics of Service Difficulty Reports tend to be biased by i
the original data base. Although such bias is not significant enough
to znvalidate the statistics, some of the following effects should be
considered in drawing conclusions from Service Difficulty Report statistics:
i-
• Because the form's use is strictly voluntary, there seems to have
been a significant loss of interest over the years in reporting
ELT false alarms. This appears to be confirmed if one compares
the decrease in ELT Incident Log Reports et AFRCC with the
decrease in Service Difficulty Reports over a comparable period
fsee Figure 3-4).
• Since these reports generally originate at airports, they may
overrepresent the causes of false alarms at such locations
somewhat. This situation, however, probably does not measurably
affect the overall statistics of ELT false alarm causes because
more than 80 percent of all ELT false alarms originate at an
airport.
• No detailed geographic analysis was performed, but a sampling
of the data suggests that Service Difficulty Reports are repre-
sentative of all FAA regions.
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V, | CHAPTER FOUR
!
: STATISTICS OF ELT INCIDENT _PORTS
This chapter presents the statistical characteristics of ELT alarm
| reports. The total of these reports represents a sample of the entire
population of ELT alarms. Projections of estimated total alarm popula-!
: tion statistics developed from these report statistics are included in
Chapter Five.
.L 4.1 TEMPO_L CItA_CTERxSTICS OF ELT FA_E N_RN _PORTS
i 4.1.1 _ng-Te_ Trends
Historical data indicate a definite downward trend in filing ELT
l false alarm reports since 1974. For _x_ple, during the first yearb _ for
• • which complete records are avaii_ie (1975), AFRCC received 6,603 reports
of ELT incidents from _ total population of approximately 160,000 ELTs.*
It is projected that in 1979 only 3,526 of these reports will be receivedfrom a total population of nearly 200,000 ELTs. This downward trend from
41 incidents to 18 incidents per 1,000 ELTs does not necessarily indicate
I that the program has matured successfully and overcome its initial start-up difficulties. Unfortunately, false alarms still constitute a s_stan-
tial majority of ELT broadcasts. The reaJons for the decline in reports
are not easily verified, but circ_stantial evidence indicates that a
I combination of dead batteries, less rigorous reporting practices,indifference, lack of clear instruction on what and where to report,
product improvement, and increased user familiarity with the units
' _ I ha_ _ contributed to the decreasing number of reports. However, it is
_ _ i difficult to draw from these figures conclusions as to the trend of
!i actual number of ELT broadcasts. The history of ELT alarm reports between1974 and 1979 is summarized in Table 4-1. It is noteworthy that during
" the two years for which NTSB data are available, only about one out of
:,, seven accidents resulted in an ELT activation. These activations
represent only a_ut i0 percent of the number of total alarms recorded i
by the AFRCC. Since not all incidents are reported, it is probable
i S that the false alarm rate is s_stantially higher than 90 percent.
I *Since installation of ELTs has been required for most general aviation L
f aircraft, the number of registered aircraft presents an accurate indicator
of the number of units in operational use.
, 4-1
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!Table 4-1. TOTAL ANNUAL ELT FALSE ALARM REPORTS
Number of Service AFRCC ELT ELT A_tivation Aircraft T|_
Year Registered Difficulty Incident Resulting from Accidents**
Aircraft* Reports Log Acciderts**
1974 153,500 1,014"** No Data No Data 4,429 7.
"+ i1975 161,500 382 6,603 630 4,253 /
1976 168,500 164 5,681 688 4,207 i, I1977 178,300 96 4,744 No Data 4,286
1978 186,600 139 4,450 No Data 4,489% _.
I
1979 198,800 43%% 3,526# No Data I 795## .i L_Ii+
*Source: "FAA Statistical Handbook of Aviation". -i !_
' **Source: National Transportation Safety Board. (Accidents are i
occurrences incident to flight resulting in fatality, serious injury, ..
destruction of aircraft, or substantial damage affecting aircraft
airworthiness.) i
***Based on 741 reports from April through December 1974. ._
%As of 30 June 1979; investigations st_ll in progress.
%%Based on 13 reports from January through March 1979 -_• I
I
#Based on 1,763 reports from January through June 1979. ._
##Through 26 July 1979; investigations still in progress.
4.1.2 Time Variations _'
The AFRCC ELT incident logs were used as the primary source of data "
for analysis. This subsection examines variations in ELT reporting _
rates and transmission duration as a function of season, day of the
week, and time of day. -I
i
4.1.2.1 Seasonal Variations
I The average daily total alarms, transmission duration*, and number
of simultaneous alarms reported are plotted on a monthly basis as shown _.
in Figure 4-1. The daily total alarms represent the average number of
incidents recorded in each sample period. Average simultaneous alarms _[
were calculated by counting and averaging the number of ELTs that were
active during one-minute segments of each day. Average transmi _n
%
L
!
*See Subsection 4.1.3 for discussion of transmission duration.
J/.
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duration (in minutes) was calculated on the basis of the average number of
simultaneously transmitting ELTs and daily total alarms as follows:
60 x 24 × Average Simultaneous Alarms _!
Average Transmission Duration = Average Daily Total Alarms
be expected, ELT activity increases in the spring and summer andAs might
decreases in the fall and winter as the weather deteriorates. It is
interesting to note that there is a large spike of activity in the month
of March, which is 64 percent larger than the minimum activity in November _|
I and 28 percent above the average annual level of activity. This large
,}
spike might be the result of the onset of spring and concurrent annual
reactivation of previously dormant aircraft. Gusty wind conditions during .,
early spring may also contribute to the high alarm rate by violently _I _
jostling parked aircraft and triggering ELTs. Variations in the trans-
mission duration and number of simultaneous alarms are substantial but
-I_ not dramatic. Maximum variation is on the order of ±15 percent.
: Figure 4-2 presents another perspective of the seasonal variation of
reported ELT incidents. In this case, the percentage of time that a "_
s: given number of ELTs are transmitting simultaneously is plotted as a 1
function of the exact number of transmitters and season of the year. The
summer season includes the period June through August, while winter "i
includes the period December through February. The summer distribution
' is obviously skewed to the right of the winter season and the annual
average distributions because of the higher percentage of time that
large numbers of ELTs are transmitting simultaneously. This phenomenon "i
-- is reflected by the significant differences in the measured mean number
of simultaneous transmissions from summer to winter, i.e., 3.12 versus
2.32, respectively.
4.1.2.2 Weekly Variations
Variations between weekday and weekend reporting activity were i
• minimal. The weekend mean of 2.84 simultaneously emitting ELTs is only
six percent greater than the weekday mean of 2.67. This difference is
inconsequential when compared with seasonal variations. Figure 4-3 i
; is a plot of the probability distribution for simultaneously emitting I
ELTs as a function of weekend, weekday, and annual average.
L 4.1.2.3 Daily variations .!
_ The average number of reported alarms was calculated for each 15- "]
minute interval of the day. The results are presented in Figure 4-4. i
The graph begins at midnight Central Standard Time (CST) and covers a -_
24-hour period. CST was selected because the AFRCC and the geographic
center of the United States are located in Central time. However, the "_
_.. number of simultaneous emitters at any given moment applies to the .:
i
entire continental United States.
There is significant daily variation of activity about the annual "I-
mean. The peak number of transmissions occurs at 6 p.m. CST with 3.78
: simultaneous alarms, while the minimum reporting rate bottoms out at .
<
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represents more than a 2:1 ratio between maximum and minimum as well as
a +40 percent, -30 percent variation about the daily mean. The times of |
high and low activity correspond well to the high and low periods of daily
aviation activity.
4.1,3 Duration of Transmission
Duration of transmission i_ defined as that period between the time -_
of the initial report of an ELT transmission and the time the source is
reported to be located and terminated. Both the Frequency Interference
Reports and the AFRCC ELT Incident Log contain records of initial reporting
time and final termination time. i
mm
Range of recorded transmission time is quite large: the shortest !,
transmission period was 3 minutes, while the longest ELT remained active "[
for more than 50 hours. Transmission durations were calculated and _;
grouped into half-hour increments. The resulting distribution is
presented in Figure 4-5. --
There are significant differences between the distributions based
on the FIR data and those based on the AFRCC data, the primary difference -.
being the much shorter durations reported in the FIRs. This difference
is ref!_cted in the mean duration of only 142.4 minutes for the FIR o,
records versus 328.6 minutes for the AFRCC records. The causes of this
difference are threefold and are important enough to warrant furtner ""
discussion: ,_
• Delay in receipt of information at the AFRCC --
• Geographic distribution of the Frequency Interference Reports
• Different objectives and characteristics of the two data bases
4.1.3.1 Delay in Receipt of Information at AFRCC ,,
All FIRs are completed locally by FAA facilities, and copies of the
report are forwarded to a central repository in Washington, D.C., after ,
the incident is closed. Conversely, AFRCC ELT Incident Logs represent
reports of emergency transmissions and their dispositions usually received ....
second- or third-hand. Typically, a report on the status of an alarm
_" will be transmitted to a local tower or FSS, from where it will be
forwarded to the ARTCC, which reports it to the AFRCC. There is an
inherent, signiflcant information-transfer delay in this communications
chain wh±le the FIR i_ filled out by field personnel who are likely to ..
be monitoring the emergency frequency. To measure this delay, FIR data
were matched with the AFRCC data so that reports describing the same
incidert could be compared directly. This process is diagrammed in _
_' Figure 4-6. Of the 251 FIRs analyzed, 91 were found to be within the
same date range as the Scott AFB data. Of the 91 FIRs, 35 ,_ould be
matched with reasonable certainty to recozds in the Scott da_a base;
i.e., _he same ELT incident was re_orded in both data bases.
, p
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Figure 4-6. MATCHING FIR AND AFRCC RECORDS "'
It was found that the time of ELT shutoff, as recorded by AFRCC,
averaged 79.5 minutes later than the time shown on the FIR. In 19 of
the 35 cases, the incident was recorded as "not found" by the AFRCC;
therefore, they had to wait for confirmed negative reports before the
incident could be closed out. On the other hand, the delay on receipt
of the initial reports that an ELT was "on" was only 4.3 minutes. On
the basis of this sample, the AFRCC data show an average silencing time
of 75.2 minutes (_9.5 - 4.3) longer than the FIRs.
In addition, the 35 incidents recorded in both the FIRs and the
AFRCC ELT Incident Logs were analyzed for pattcrns in delay of information
_. receipt. There also appears to be a trend toward an increasing communi-
cation delay with increasing transmission duration. The significance of
this trend is that a significant portion of the transmission time recorded
by AI'RCC may be due to slow notification. The true distribution of trans-
I mission durations may be more like the FIR curve than the AFRCC curve. ._
4.1.3.2 Different Geographic Distribution of Sample Populations
< California is one of the most diligent states in filinQ FIRs, with _I
". the result that more than 75 percent cf FIRs originate in California, ._
as compared with only 20 percent of the AFRCC ELf Incident Logs, as
_._ presented in Table 4-2. This disparity in the geographical characteris- -_
_, tics of the two data bases may contribute to different perceived trans-
.I
mission durations if California is particularly effective at locating
and silencing ELTs. -_
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Table 4-2. COMPARISON OF FIR AND ELT
I INCIDENT LOGS BY LOCATIONw
ELT °
I Location oz Incident Incident FIRsLog
California 95 195
I Arizona and Nevada 18 47
Remainder of United States 439 9
!
4.1.3.3 Different Sample Captured by the Two Data Sources
I All FIRs are filed by FAA facilities to highlight occurrences of
frequency jamming. Each occurrence is identified by an FAA facility,
usually a control tower or Flight Service Station monitoring with ground-
I based receivers. The reception range of these receivers is limited by
' line-of-sight limitations of VHF radio signals. Thus most towers dnd
FSSs receive transmissions only from sources at oz- very near the airport
I location. As a result, ELTs recorded on the FIRs are relatively edsie,"to locate than those recorded on the AFRCC reports, which include many
signal sources in remote locations as well as those from airports. In
addition, AFRCC logs may include records of signals from airports during
I when the tower is closed and is factor in
periods not a quickly detecting
and silencing the ELT. This situation is shown in Table 4-3. Thus the
two data bases are, in effect, recording the problem from different
I viewpoints.
I Table 4-3. COMPARISON OF FIR AND ELT
INCIDENT LOG SOURCES
Number of Incidents
I Signal Source
Reported
(Where Known ) ELT
5
[ _ FIRs Incident
I Logs
i Towered Airport 134 215N ntowered Airport ]7 17
I Unknown Airport 0 65
t
I Othez 0 98
Total ]5] 543
iL
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4.2 GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF ELT FALSE ALARM REPORTS
_°
As discussed previously, only tile AFRCC ELT Incident Logs are filed i
on a national basis; therefore, the AFRCC data base will be used exclu- ""
sively as a basis for this discussion.
4.2.1 Nationzl Distribution b.
The AFRCC receives and tracks reports of ELT transmissions principally -_
from FAA Air Route Traffic Control Centers (ARTCCs) . Figure 4-7 is a ma}_ .i
of the sources of ELT incident reports. One would |lave expected Los
Angele::, Chicago, New York, and Miami to have the largest number of
-:
reports submitted to AFRCC because these centers represent areas of
heaviest general aviation activity. In fact, there seems to be r,o -,
particular national pattern for predicting the number of ELT incident
reports. It is interesting to note that tile Seattle region, which is "_
ranked ninth nationally in total aviation activity, submits tile second .i
largest number of reports to AFRCC.
, 4.2.2 Origin of Located False Alarms
Figure 4-8 summarizes the d_ta revie:_'cd in tnis effort. More than
80 percent of all incidents that were eventually traced to a specific
aircraft were found at airports. In fact, nearly 40 percent of the -.
total 553 records examined indicated that the ELT was physically found
at a towered airport. The implications of these data are significant -:
because the average transmission duration at towered airports is only
half that from all other origins. Thus the cost of locating these
signals should be significantly lower than for all other alarms. It
may also be easier to implement workable administrative procedures to
control false alarms at towered airports than at the other locations. "
If an ELT cannot be located quickly, the AFRCC will initiate a
mission, that is, deploy SAR forces to 1.ocate and silence the ELT. ..
AFRCC maintains separate records of all alarms for which missions were
initiated. One hundred seventy-six of the 1,402 incident_ in our I
sample period resulted in such missions. In 39 of these records the ,.
sJq;_al terminated before it could be located. One hundred six of
': the remaining 137 records originated at airports, and the remainder -.
" i were scattered evenly between miscellaneous ori_]_ns. Tlle distribution
of mission reports by origin is presented in Figure 4-9. '_
r
4. _ CAUSES OF FALSE ALARMS _,
_ Analysis of the Frequency Interference Reports and Service Difficulty _,
Reports identified four basic: reported causes of false alarms:
• Human Error. A preventable fal.'_ealarm results from someone's
--Q
carelessness. For example, ally signal transmitted by an ELT
not mounted in an airp]._ne would be classified as human error _,
Z
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since the unit should have been switched to "OFF" prior to
removal from the aircraft. Human error may be subdivided into
-?
six major causes:
•" The pilot bumps the G-switch with some part of his body.
•. The ELT is set off by a shock, such as dropping the unit
or throwing baggage against it. .a
•. A passenger, or other untrained layman, unknowingly sets -_
off the ELT. _ '
m_
•" The switch is found in the ON position.
•" The ELT is installed improperly so as to make it easily _
triggered. _
•" The ELT goes off while the aircraft is under the care of "T
maintenance personnel
• G-Switch. The deceleration-sensitive switch often malfnnctions
and sets off the ELT, as follows: -.
•. Jammed -- The switch sometimes became mechanically stuck in _,
the ON position, which is a fairly common occurrence.
•. Sensitive -- The ELT is triggered by turbulence, heavy
wind, a sla_ed door, hard landing, or a similar force that -,
should not have been sufficient to activate the ELT.
•" Stuck on -- The ELT cannot be reset, or it transmits con-
tinuously in the OFF or ARM positions. In these cases the _,
antenna or battery must generally be removed to silence
the unit.
•. Defective/shorted -- This malfunction represents all other ....
switch-related mechanical or electrical problems, except
for corrosion. ""
!
• Corrosion. Circuits short or are rendered inoperative by _"
corrosion, which in most cases results from leaky lithium
sulfur dioxide batteries. If a corroded switch activates the
ELT, it is classified under "corrosion".
• Miscellaneous. These are unusual causes represented by the
following:
•. Water-activated -- Water or moisture seeps into the ELT
and shorts enough components to cause an activation. .,
•o Radio-activated -- ELT is sensitive to the pilot's keying ._
the VHF transmitter.
•. Heat-activated -- ELT is exposed to excessive heat, typically "_ !
_, absorbing direct sunlight in a closed cabin during the
summer.
h
"T
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4.3.1 Analysis of Causes of Service Difficulty Reports
Table 4-4 summarizes the reported causes found in the Service
Difficulty Reports from 1974 to 1979. The data base consists of 60
consecutive months from April 1974 to March 1979. Many incident8"
" i reports show no cause or present insufficient information to determine|.
a cause. These reports are listed as "unknown". For example, an ELT
could go off without a sign of careless handling or equipment defect.
if_ [ If the ELT is properly reset and gives no further trouble, the incident
"_ L is listed as "unknown". Many reports simply state "ELT activated". With
the absence of further information, these incidents are also charac-
:_ [ terized as "unknown". " I
.i[ Table 4-4. SUMMARY OF CAUSES OF ELT INCIDENTS (BASED ON 1,541
SERVICE DIFFICULTY REPORTS)
Namber of Reports by Reporting Period _ _
Cause Total ,
1974" 1975 19"6 1977 1978 1979"*
Human Error 84 56 20 12 6 0 178
_ G-Switch 144 62 31 30 38 3 308
_ _ i- Corrosion 46 49 29 29 54 4 211
I_ Miscellaneous 38 ll 9 5 6 0 69
I Unknown 435 204 75 20 35 6 775
I" Total 747 382 164 96 139 13 1,541
*April through December.
i **January through March.
Table 4-4 demonstrates that the nature of false alarm reports has
' I changed over time. Valuable information may be deduced from the relative
i magnitudes of the four causes of false alarms.
'i _ Figure 4-10 depicts trends in the relative importance of the four
I main causes of ELT false alarms, excluding "unknown", from the total
population for purposes of this calculation. Both the "human error"
_ and "mi_-ellaneous ''categories show a definite decline over the years,
:_I I I probably as a result of increasing user familiarity with the equipment.
: It is also possible that since the ELT itself performed as it should,
the filing of the Service Difficulty Report was considered unnecessary.
I: # G-switch-related problems remain essentially unchanged since 1974,_ reflecting a stable technology base. The alarms, because of battery
_"_ corrosion, have commanded a growing share of false alarm reports as i
F_ the Li-SO 2 batteries aged. However, it is expected that this trend in
i I_ battery-related failures should be reversed as a result of the FAA's
ii
.
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_ Airworthiness Directive (AD) requiring rei,_val of Li-SO 2 batteries from
I ELTs as of 26 February 1979. This directive effectively removed thousands-4 of ELTs from service, and it is expected to result in a dramatic decrease
_ in reported incidents during 1979. A subsequent AD in August 1979
published a new battery specification that is expected to allev_ate the
/: corrosion problem.
'_" 4.3.2 Analysis of Causes of Frequency Interference Reports
:_i The FIRs are too few in number to provide representative statistical
data on causes of ELT false alarms. In addition, the reports are filed
_ _ primarily in California and may contain some atypical biases in the
_- cample that do not exist for the nation as a whole. The following
_ discussion is intended only to provide a qualitative background in FIR|
statistics.
,! Eighty-one of the total number (151) of FIR reports listed the cause
as "unknown", leaving 70 reports for which the cause could be identified.
_' I Only two reports were categorized under corrosion or miscellaneous,
,_ • providing a sharp contrast to the Service Difficulty Reports. This
_ contrast can be explained by the fact that FIRs are generally submitted
by ATCT or FSS personnel who are not directly involved in the search for
a transmitting ELT. When a radiating ELT is located and silenced, thef
tower will notice only that the frequency has been cleared. The: airport
staff, who actually found the ELT, will not necessarily call the tower
I to inform them of the cause, or they may call before anyone has had anopportunity to pen the ELT and inspect for damage. As a result, it is
not unexpected that so few cases of corrosion were reported. Many of
I the incidents listed as "unknown" were undoubtedly corrosion-related.
Human error was the most reported cause of a false alarm, accounting
for 48 of the known incidents, or 69 percent. Twenty-three of these 48
I incidents occurred while the aircraft or ELT was undergoing maintenance;in 18 cases the switch was found "on", and in 7 of those cases the switch
was activated, shocked, or bumped. Most of these errors could have been
I prevented if aircraft owners and maintenance personnel had more respectfor the sensitivity of the ELT. The G-switch, theoretically, should not
trigger simply because the aircraft is undergoing maintenance, but
• evidently the stresses resulting from working on the airframe or engine
! _ can activat., an overly sensitive unit. Disarming the ELT prior to
% 4 maintenance work would virtually eliminate this problem. The causes of
ELT false alarms recorded on FIRs are summarized in Table 4-5.
4.4 MAKE AND MODEL STATISTICS OF ELT FALSE ALARM REPORTS
A significant percentage of the FIRs and SDR$ contained specific
•. make or model information. Therefore, the reports were analyzed on a
make and model basis to determine if any significant _atterns emerged.
,l
t
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Table 4-5. SUMMARY OF CAUSES
LISTED ON FIRs* [
L
Number
Cause
Reporting !]
Human Error 48
G-Switch 20 []
Corrosion 1
*_ Miscellaneous 1
Unknown 81 _]
*Based on 151 Frequency Inter-
ference Reports
' I
More than 80 percent of the SDRs filed between 1974 and 1978 were
traced to units manufactured by Communications Components Corporation, i
Emergency Beacon Corporation, Garrett, and Leigh Systems. (It must be i
. °
reme_nbered that the appearance of a firm's units in many reports does
not necessarily indicate poor quality or defective hardware because a
disproportionately large number of those units could have been installed.)
With one exception, the number of SDRs traced to each manufacturer
decreased significantly during that period. For example, Leigh Systems
was referenced 459 times in 1974 but only 24 times in 1978. References
to Garrett Corporation and Emergency Beacon Corporation decreased from
64 to 20 and 94 to 5, respectively. These data are summarized in Tables
4-6, 4-7, and 4-8. Table 4-9 presents similar data for FIRs.
The specific statistical conclusions that can be drawn from this
analysis are limited by a number of factors: ..
• • The number of reports filed per ma,_ufacturer/model per year is
a small statistical sample, on the order of 20 reports or less.
Therefore, annual variations for any given manufacturer may be _"
as much a function of normal statistic&l fluctuations between ..
- samples as of actual differences in _erformance. However, it
could be expected that long-term, multiyear trends will be ._
reflected properly.
• The total population of each manufacturer's product in use at
I. any given time is dynamic. For example, different models may -_
be introduced, upgraded, modified, or discontinued. At the
_' same time, consumer's priorities and interests change, different ""
products gain favor or fall into disfavor, and ELTs are replaced _,
in the field.
J
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/" Table 4-6. SUMMARY OF ELT INCIDENT REPORT TRENDS (BASED ON 1,541
SERVICE DIFFICULTY REPORTS)
Number of Reports by Reporting PeriodManufacturer
I Total
- (Model) 1974" 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979"*
ACR Electronic 4 5 1 2 1 0 13
[ Division(RLB i01, RLB 5)
_ Aero Electric 7 7 4 5 7 1 31
I (Pointer 2 2000,-_. 3000)
Aircraft Products 9 4 5 1 1 0 20
_ I (Alert 50) ._Communications 12 9 9 18 60 4 112
} Components
Corporation l
''. [ (CIR i0, CIR ii) 1
i Dorne& Margolin 16 4 5 5 8 _ 41• f, (DMELT 13,
i [ D_LT 52)
t Edo 1 1 1 3 1 0 7 i
/ I" E_rgency Beacon 94 56 30 20 5 3 208 !
I. Corporation i
(EBC 102, EBC 302) I
|" Garrett 64 45 18 9 20 1 157 _i
I. (Rescu 88) !
Larago Electric 32 16 I0 1 4 0 63
'" Manufacturing. (1005) !
Leigh Systems 459 184 70 28 24 1 766
- (Sharc 7)
Martech Division 8 9 2 1 2 0 22
. (EB 2B) "i
I Narco Ii 23 4 3 5 0 46: (ELT i0)
:' Pathfinder Company 24 I0 3 0 0 0 37
' i (2052) {
Radair 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(Dart 2)
Unknown 6 9 2 0 1 0 18
. Total 747 382 64 96 139 13 1,541
I *April through December.
**January through March.
:
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TTable 4-7. CAUSES OF ELT FALSE ALARMS (BASED ON 1,541 SERVICE DIFFICUL'_Y REPORTS)
Number of Reports by Cause T
ManufacturL (Model) Human Total
G-Switch Corroslon Miscellaneous Unknowr]
Err_r
r
ACR Electronlc Dzvlsiop 4 5 1 0 3 13
(RLB ICI, RLB 5)
Aero E_ectric 6 5 8 2 i0 31
(Pointer 2, 2000, 3000) L
Aircraft Products 2 8 0 1 9 20
(Alert 50)
Communlcatlons Components 4 50 33 0 25 112 "-
-._1' Corporatlon :|,
(CIR i0, CIR ii) "_
Dorne& Margolin 4 9 8 3 17 41
(DMELT lJ, DMELT 52) _|
Edo O 1 3 0 3 7
Emergency Beacon 72 35 1 7 93 20_
Co_poratlon "]
(EBC 102, EBC )02)
Garrett 31 27 14 9 76 557
(Rescu 88)
Larago Eiectrlc 8 21 0 3 31 b3
Manufacturing }
(1005)
Lelgh Systems 24 133 123 34 452 76[_ ]
(Sharc 7) i
Martech Dlvlslon 3 5 3 I i0 22
(EB 2B)
Narco 15 5 5 0 21 46 I
(ELT i0) )
Pathfinder Company 2 1 Ii 7 15 37
(2052) "]
Radair 0 0 0 0 0 O !
v
(Dart 2)
Unknown 3 3 0 2 I0 IH " ,
' I
_ Total 178 308 211 69 775 1,541 •
.i1
i ,
&
!
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Table 4-8. DETAILS OF REPORTS BY MANUFACTURER,
i AUSE, AND YEAR (BASED ON 1,541
SERVICE DIFFICULTY REPORTS)
Number of Reports by Year
Cause
Communications Components Corporation
I
Human Error 1 i ....
{
! G-Switch 4 6 0 12 27 1
!
Corrosion - - 3 5 22 2
_,iscellaneous
s Emergency Beacon Corporation
Human Error 30 20 13 6 3 0
G-Switch 12 i0 5 6 1 1
Corrosion - 1 ....
Miscellaneous - 1 3 3 - -
Garrett
l
Human Error 16 ii 1 1 2 -
G-Switch 8 8 5 7 3 1
Corrosion - - - 4 i0 -
Miscellaneous 4 - 2 - 3 -
Leigh Systems
/ Human Error 1_ 9 2 - _ _%
[ G-.<witch 90 22 12 6 3 -
-i
Corrosion 43 33 22 15 I0 -
Misce] laneous 24 4 2 2 2 -
4
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Table 4-9. CAUSES OF ELT FALSE ALARMS (BASED ON 151 FREQUENCY INTERFERENCE REPORTS) ,,il
.... |
Number of Reports by Cause _-
Manufacturer (Model) ; Total
Human
G-Switch Corrosion Miscellaneous Unknown "_Error
ACR Electronic Division 0 0 1 0 2 3 ._
(RLB I01, RL5 5)
Aero Electric 0 2 0 0 4 6
(Pointer 2, 2000, 3000)
Aircraft Products 2 0 0 0 I 3
(Alert 50)
Communications Components 1 3 0 0 i0 14
Corporation I(CIR I0, CIR II)
Dorne& Margolin 1 0 0 O 6 7
(DMELT .3, DMELT 52)
• Edo 0 0 0 0 0 0
Emergency Beacon 12 1 0 0 19 32 _.
Corporation _.
(EBC 102, EBC 302) I
Garrett 4 I 0 0 5 i0 :'
(Rescu 88)
Larago Electrlc 0 1 0 0 3 4 ._
Manufacturing
(i005) '
Leigh Systems 6 2 0 1 6 15
(Sharc 7)
Martech Division 0 1 0 0 3 4
_EB 2B)
Narco 6 0 0 0 12 18
'ELT I0)
Pathfirder Company 0 0 0 0 0 0
(2052)
Radair 0 0 0 (_ 0 O
(Dart 2)
Unknown 16 9 0 0 I0 35
_, Total _ 48 20 1 1 81 151
1980004005-056
|!
" The regulatory climate may have significant impact on the actual
= _ usage patterns of equipment installed in the field. For example,| a recent Airworthiness Directive required the removal of the
battery from all units po_,ered by Li-SO2 batteries. The immediate
impact of this directive is expected to decrease the n_imbur of
|:_ reports by about 37 percent.
• '£he distribution of manufacturers has changed markedly since 1974.
I Of the 14 manufacturers identified in 1975 as producers of ELTs,less than 5 are actively marketing units today.
- No statistically accurate data were collected that describe either
I the total population of ELTs in use or the manufacturer's make andmodel distributions.
" I 4.5 MATHEMATICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF SIMULTANEOUS ELT REPORTS
The distribution of simultaneous transmissions _resented in Section
: I 4.1 was compared with mathematical distributions of known characteristics| tO develop an analytical model of the statistical behavior of simultaneous
i :: ELT reports. The ELT _x)pulation exhibits several characteristics that
I imply a Poisson behavior:
I
• ELT activation Js a random process.
• _ • For any given ELT at any given moment, only two results are| possible -- transmitting or not transmltting.
• The probability of either condition's existing for any given ELT
I at any given moment is approximately constant throughout thepopulation.
• The number of simultaneously transmitting ELTs at any given moment
I must be an integer.
It is evident from *_gure 4-11 that a PoJsson distribution whos_.•
I expected value (_) is equal to the average number of simultaneously trans-mitting ELTs predicts very closely the results gathered from AFRCC records.
The advantage of using a Poisson characterization is that the exact
I shape of the probability curve depends only on the mean of the indei_endent
4"
; • variable, in this case, the number of ELTs transmitting simultaneously.
_: ' Thus it is necessary only to calculate the mean to determine the entire
t distribution. I.'romthis value it is easy to calculate tile probability| that the number of simultaneous transmissions is greater than a giw, n value.
• This property will be used in subsequent analyses.
"_ I 4.6 SIGNIFICANCE OF ELT AI.,_RMREPORTS
:,
T The data presented in this chapter were derived from a sample of the
J total number of ELT reports. The ELT repo, ts themselves are actually a
4-25
1980004005-057
..t - 0
I |
_ _ o ,-, o
;, mull, I0 _ummd
:- 4-26
1980004005-058
Lsample of the true total number of ELT false alarms that must be calculated
I on the basis of the parameters compiled in this chapter. Chapter Five pre-sents the necessary calculations and results describing the nature of the
I total number of ELT alarms.
I
I
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CHAPTER F1 VE
DATA ANALYSIS
[ 5.1 RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION
_ • Chapter Four developed statistical measures describing the nature of
_" ELT alarm reports on the basis of a random sampling of these reports. |__However, these measures provide only a partial representation of the
extent and nature of the total ELT false alarm problem, as illustrated |in Figure 5-1. l
In Figure 5-1 the dark central region represents the actual report _samples selected and studied. The region within the gray boundaries ,
represents the total population of reports as inferred from the random i
sample and discussed in Chapter Four. i .
i
This chapter is a discussion of the estimated characteristics of
all ELT alarms, reported and unreported, _s represented by the white
I region in Figure 5-1. These characteristics were calculated as describedherein on the basis of data presented in previous chapters. The param-
eters of primary interest are:
I • Number of unreported incidents s
• Probability of simultaneous incidents
I • Geographic distribution of incidents 1
• Causes and sources of incidents
I • Costs of incidents
' These calculati_ns will be used as a basis for cost-benefit analyses
of various control strategies presented in the remainder of this report.
• j
!
}
5.2 TOTAL REPORTED AND UNREPORTED INCIDENTS
As previously discussed, none of the three data bases contain a
record of every ELT alarm nor does the aggregate of these data bases i
represent all alarms. Therefore, the number of unreported alarms must
be estimated to assess the magnitude problem, to
of the determine the
number of ELT signals that SARSAT may encounter, and to calculate th_
benefits of each proposed strategy to reduce false alarms.
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Figure 5-1. RELATIONSHIP OF DATA SOURCES TO TOTAL ELT
ALARM POPULATION
%
, _Fhe distribution of reports by ARTCC provides a clue in this r_gard i
because some centers seem to be more conscientious than others ir report-
ing incidents to AFRCC. For example, the Seattle Center, despite its low
population base, has almost twice as many reports as New York and more ! i
than six times as many as Chicago. Only the Los Angeles center, with its
' very large general aviation fleet, filed more reports _han Seattle.
If the actual reporting rates at each ARTCC could be determined, or
if the efficiency of the most conscientious center could be estimated,
then an estimate of the number of unreported incidents could be calculated.
Unfortunately, there are no data concerning the reporting efficiency of i
' each ARTCC. Therefore, unreported alarms had to be estimated on the basis
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of the efficiency of the most conscientious center. Certain critical
assumptions were made in this process:
i. Reporting efficiency and the ELT alarm rate are measurable in
terms of alarms per unit of aircraft population (i.e. alarms4-
' • per 1,000 aircraft) and unit of aviation activity (i.e., alarms| per 1,000,000 recorded operations -- takeoffs and landings -- at
towered airports).
I 2. The Seattle ARTCC reports the highest percentage of alarms, i.e.,57 percent, which is based on the verbal s imate of a Washington
; State SAR official. This rate is equivalent to 0.158 alarms per
aircraft. Alternative estimates were obtained from the state of
I Louisiana and from three general aviation airports (Montgomery
County, Maryland; Long Beach/Santa Ana, California; Opa Locka,
_; Florida). These alternate estimates ranged from 0.058 to 0.174
_" I and indicate that the Seattle estimate is of the proper order of
• magnitude.
_ • 3. The FIR ELT transmission duration curve given in Subsection 4.1.3
is representative of the characteristics of unreported incidents.I Although FIRs are filed primarily in the FAA Western Region, most
of the state aviation officials interviewed stated that assistance
I from AFRCC is not requested unless the ELT cannot be locatedwithin an hour. This circumstance, coupled with th natur of the
FIR reporting process, supports the validity of such an assumption. !
I 4. Silencing time is independent of geographic location; therefore,a natio ally val d, uniform silencing-time curve can be developed.
5. The ELT alarm rate is independent of geographical location. This |
I assumption implies that the calculated alarms per unit of measure
]
for the most conscientious ARTCC can be applied to all other
ARTCCs. While there may in fact be some geographical alarm rate
I variations from center to center (possibly due to weather or manu-facturer mix), the variation actually observed (greater than 8:1)
is too high to be credible.
I 5.2.1 Reporting Efficienccy_
Aircraft registration data as of 31 December 1977 were extracted from
i_ _ the FAA Statistical Handbook of Aviation. Data for recorded a_rcraft
' D operations at towered airports _n 1978 were obtained from the publication
FAA Air Traffic ActivitLl. Both sets of data had been collected on a
• state-by-state basis; therefore, it was necessary to allocate each state'sI share to one or more ARTCC. Three different methods were applied to
_ achiewt this goal:
_ • Totals for states entirely within a given ARTCC* were summed
.f. completely iDto the fLgures for that ARTCC.
I *Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Washington, D.C., Kansas, Maine,Marylar_d, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Carolina, 1
Vermont, Vi£ginia, Washington.
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• Totals for some states spanning two or more ARTCCs were apportioned r
on the basis of human population. These states* had aviation com- "!
munities based primarily in several distinct population centers, .; ;.
obviously within the bounds of a particular ARTCC. Each population
center was surrounued by sparsely settled countryside.
d
• Totals for several of the largest states that cross center bound- ..
aries** were apportioned according to detailed data on operations
at towered airports. The number of operations at each airport was _
allocated to a particular ARTCC; the total statewide operations and :
aircraft registrations were apportioned according to the proportions
represented by these totals and are presented in Table 5-1.
The resulting distribution of aircraft and operating rates by ARTCC are
presented in Table 5-1. While the above methodology appears somewhat complex,
errors in allocation can affect only regional statistics. Once the prevailing
false alarm rate is calculated for the highest reporting center, this rate
applies to the entire continental United States. Thus, if a given state's
aircraft are allocated incorrectly among two or more centers, the errors in
the estimate of unreported alarms in those two centers will offset each other.
i The accuracy of the estimates rests principall_ on assumptions 1 and 2 above :
and the accuracy of the FAA statistics on aircraft and operations.
Derived reporting rates for each ARTCC are presented in Table 5-].
The highest reporting rate was exhibited by the Seattle ARTCC. With allow- •
ances made for Seattle's 57 percent reporting efficiency, representative
alarm rates were calculated at 90.2 alarms per 1,000 aircraft and 330
alarms per l,O00,000 operations. These alarm rates were applied to each _
ARTCC to develop total alarms per ARTCC using both measures.
The known causes of ELT alarms listed in the Service Difficulty Reports
" indicate that 77.6 percent of the alarms were traceable to causes propor-
tional to aircraft population and 22.4 percent to causes proportional to
operational activity level. By using these weighting factors, the estimates
for each ARTCC derived by these two independent techniques were averaged.
The results of this calculation are presented as estimated alarm rates by
ARTCC in Figures 5-2 and 5-3. It can be seen that there is approximately
a 3:1 ratio for alarms _redicted in the centers with the largest and small-
est number of alarn.s, Los Angeles and Salt Lake City, respectively. On
the average, approximately 966 al_rms can be expected for each ARTCC, a
- significant percentage of which originate in major metropolitan areas
such as Los Angeles, New York, Chicago, Cleveland, and San Francisco.
5.2.2 Transmission Duration
• Only 4,301 of the total estimated 19,311 alarms were expected to be
" . reported to AFRCC in 1978 on the basis of the llg-day sample investigated.
.[, The actual number reported in 1978 was slightly higher (4,450) as a result
*Alabama, Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, iowa, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Washington, West Virginia,
, Wisconsin, Wyoming.
**California, Florida, New York, Pennsylvania, Texas.
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of statistical fluctuations. For purposes of consistency, however, the esti-
mated (4,301) figure was used in analyzing the transmission duration and
other characteristics of ET,T alarms. Figure 5-4 presents the transmission-
duration distribution curve for the total estimated ELT alarm population. "
Values for the curve were derived as a weighted average composite of the
AFRCC transmission-duration distribution, representing 4,301 reported inci- l
dents (22.3 percent of the total) and the FIR distribution, representing
15,010 unreported incidents (77.7 percent of the total).
_ More than 50 percent of the alarms are expected to terminate in less
than 1.5 hours; however, the small number of long alarms ansmitting for
15 hours or longer weights the mean to about 3 hours. The impact of these
--I
long duration i0- and 15-hour alarms is significant because the expected I
number of simultaneous transmissions is directly proportional to the °J
average duration of ELT transmission.
5.3 PROBABILITY OF SIMULTANEOUS INCIDENTS
, The probability distribution for simulta, eously transmitting ELTs
illustrated in Figure 5-5 is a Poisson distribution characterized by an
exp_ ted value, _, defined by the equation
_Number of EL_ [ Average ELT]
iTransmission _ x ITransmissi°nl
rAverage Number] L per Year J L| Duration |(Minutes) J
pf Simultaneoufl = -.....
LTransmissi°ns J [Minutes per Year]
or
19,311 × 176.o
=
525,600
= 6.49
£he estimated number of simultaneous alarms as calculated above is within
the expected capacity of SARSAT. On an annual average, six to seven ELTs
can be expected to be transmitting simultaneously throughout the continental
United States. Since the distribution is Poisson, the mean determines the
entire distribution. Therefore, i0 or more ELTs will be transmitting simul- ""
taneously approximately 14 percent of the time. The probability of four _r .i
fewer simultaneous transmissions is comparably small, i.e., 20 percent. Of
course, there will be more activity (average of more than eight simuita- -_r
neous transmissions) during the summer and less activity (average less
:' than five simultaneous transmissions) during the winter. This variation
in activity level will affect the shape of the distribution somewhat,
i.e., shifting it to the right in the summer and to the left in the winter.
In addition, the transmitting ELTs are not necessarily distributed
._ uniformly throughout the continental United States, as will be discussed
_ in Section 5.4.
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5.4 GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF ALARMS
I The performance levels demanded of a satellite ELT detection/location
system depend no< only on the number and duration of signal sources but
also on the spatial distribution of alarms. There are, in fact, significant
I differences in signal source densitie_ from ARTCC to A_TCC and also withil,
_u.u ARTCCs. Th s section examines the g ographic alarm density distribu-
tion on a national scale and the probabilities of simultaneous emissions
i as a function of alarm distribution within an ARTCC.
5.4.1 Geographic Alarm Density Distribution
I More than 95 percent of ELT reports (and thus, it is assumed, morethan 95 percent of ELT alarms) originate from land areas (see Figure 4-8).
The average geographic density of ELT alarms per ARTCC was calculated on
I the basis of annual alarm rates of Figure 5-2 and on estimates of landar a covered by each ARTCC. FAA estimates of tot_l ARTCC area were used
for mest centers. In the case of ARTCCs encompassing major bodies of
I water, the FAA-estimated total area was reduced ] s an estimate of the
water area.
0 Seven ARTCCs exhibiting alarm densities greater than i0 alarms per
{ I 1,000 square miles annually were studied in greater detail. For each of
these centers* the total number of a]arms was apportioned geographically
within the ARICC on the basis of flight plans filed at Flight Service
Stations** This process is illustrated in Figure 5-6, a map of _,_e l.os
Angeles ARTCC showing the locations of all the FSSs and the number of
flight plans filed at each FSS. A totai of 823,200 fliqht plans were
filed in this center. Five of the 25 FSSs corresponding to the Los Anqeles-
i corridor accounted for approximate±y 48 percent of all fliqht
San Diego
plans filed. These five are specifically identified by a star on the map.
The area of _.',erage for these stations was determined by establishing a
I boundary line chat approxlmately bisects the regions between adjacentstations. ELT alarm rates were assumed to be proportional to flight plans
filed; therefore, 48 percent of all alarms are assumed to have originated
I from within _he shaded region and 52 percent from within the unshadedregion. AlaLm density, in terms of thousands of alarms per square mile,
was then talc'gated on the basis of estimated area of coverage for both
the high-density a._d low-density regions. Calculated in this manner, the
I density of aldrms in the Los Angeles basin (6 percent of area) is estimated<_ to b_' 92.'2 alarms annuall_ pe£ thousand square miles, as comparod with an
• average of 12.7 alarms for the overall Los Angeles ARTCC.! Oakland an8 Washington, D.C. centers behaved similarly because both
centers covered a major metropolitan region surrounded by relatively
. unpopu]ated countryside. Suprisingly, activity was distributed fairlyI
'; *New York, Miami, Cleveland, Chicago, Los Angeles, Oakland, and Washinqton,
• 1 D.C.
**Barboza, G., Pil()t Briefino 4ctivit_ Forecasts for Flight Service Stations -
2984, MTR-6441, July 28, 15/3.
5-1_
I
1980004005-070
|5-12
1980004005-071
i |
evenly within the New York, Chicago, and Cleveland centers. The alarm
._ • densities in the continental United States are listed in Table 5-2 and
! plotted in Figure 5-7.
The impact of thi_ uneven distribution of alarms is significant, i,1
I the Los Angeles region, for example, the alarm density ran_ed from a low7.1 alarms per 1,000 square miles in the ru[-al areas to 92.2 in the Los
Angeles-San Diego corridor. Other centers exhibit similar, if not as
i dramatic, behavior.
5.4.2 Probabllity of Simulatneous Transmission within A Specif_ea Area
I Alarm densities have significant, direct impact on the urobabilitv
a
of multiple simultaneous transmissions within a specified area of coveraL]c.
This probability function is significant because the ability of $ARSAT to
I distinguish simultaneous alarms depends in part on tho geographic separa-"_ t on of those alarms. This subsectio will examine the proo bi]Ity of
simultaneous transmissions over a relatiw, iy large area -- such as an
• ARTCC -- and over a relatively small area -- sPch as a major city. The
a i number of simultaneous alarms is characterized by a Poisson distribution
according to the formula
I p(n; \)
(.\)n(e)
= (l)
n l
I where
p(n;\) = the probability that n ELTs are transmittin_ simultaneously,
i given that the aw:rage number of simultaneously transmittinq
EI,TS is \
Now, the probability that two or more ELTs transmit simultaneously i._
I simply
p(n _ 2;\) = 1 - [p(0;l) + p(l;\)] (2)
= - + (\) ) = I- (e) - (\) (e) ,
• • .
| If we expand into a ::cries and neqlect hi,lhor-order terms for small \ tfor
a sinqle ARTCC, \ i;; on tho order of 0.32; for a metropolitan area, it i_': t,
milch smaller) :
' iI'(n 2; _) : -- I_)
r o, 1 r ]
A,'<.ra.ie p',ansmi-_sionsj L/ l.<.n,thMinutesin// i\. • \ = .qimult.lnoous -" Mintltos per Year "I Tlan:;lll i S.'I i_)11.'; t
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TJble 5-2. ALARM DENSITY AS A FUNCTfON OF I,OCATION
Number Alarm Density (_,)**Land ""
RTCC o f
Area*
Alarms Peak Average Minimum --
Albuquerque 687 220.5 *** 3.1 *** "'
Atlanta 820 lu5.4 *** 7.8 *** --
Boston 791 93.2 *** 8.5 *** ..
Ch icaqo 1,343 99.7 _ 13.5
Cleveland 1,198 71.7 _@------ 16.7 --
Denver 658 271 .S *** 2.4 ***
Fort Worth 1,019 iS7.6 *** 5.4 ***
Houston i,i13 i63.4 *** 6.8 ***
' Indianapolis 844 97.2 *** 8.7 ***
Jacksonville 472 83.4 *** 5.7 ***
Kansas City 1,[]45 168.1 *** 6.2 ***
Los Anqeles 1,725 136.1 _I2.2"'." 12.7 7.i
Memphis 639 141.1 *** 4.5 ***
bliami 876 2S. 5 44.6J"I" 30.7 26. "2
Minnedpolis ],08_3 344.4 *** 3.2 ***
New York 1,377 43.3 4_------ 31.8
Oakland 1,IS4 105.9 24.5# 11.2 4.5
Seattle 1,002 183.3 *** 5.5 ***
Salt L_Ike 5q3 405.3 *** 1.5 ***
Washinqton, D.C. 834 80.0 23.7## I 4.0
*In 1,000 square miles.
I
**Annual alarms per 1,000 square miles.
• ***Alarm density assumed constant throughout ARTCC.4
"!'.18percent of total alarms in 6.6 percent of land area.
"_q'35.7 percent of total alarms ill 24.7 percent of land area.
#73 p_cent of total alarms in 33.3 percent of land area.
##?4.3 percent of total alarms in 32.7 percent of land area.
_8
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dnd
pecifie_ = _'"R ..
Annual = / per 1,000 | \ L Area J 1,000TransmLssions LSquare MilesJ ..
Averaqe ..
Transmission
= 176.6 (see Figure 5-5)
Lenqth in
Minutes
. .
Minutes per Year = 525,600
\ = 1.06 x 10-bR2,,
where
R = separation between simultaneously transmitting] ELTs (in mile.-.)
_' = alarm density ill re_lion (annual alarms per 1,000 square miles)
i
Substitutinq into Equation (3) yields
p(n " 2;\) = 5.t, \ (10)-3(R) 4 (d) l (4)
Ecuation 4 is plotted as a family of curves ill Fic]ure 5-S. The left
w, rtical scale provides the probability of simultaneous tran,'missions durinq
one year as a functio', of maximum allowable transmission separation and
alarm density. Tile riqht-hand scah-:_ convert tilt,so probability fiqurcs into
total ntlmbc]F Of minutes and hours per year that two or more ELTs can be
ox!,t,ctt,d to transmit :ainltl]tatlt'ous]%." from a si':'clfiod re,lion. Each curve is
spccifiod by a _ fdt-tor that corrosl_mds directly to tilt, alarm density values
},I'l,.qt, lltt_d ill 'l',lblo 5-2. S_'t,al'at ioll bt'twot'n :;inltlltdllOOtlsl_" tl',lllSlllit tilhl EI.T:;
i:; },r_,:_t,lltt,d 011 thc abscis._;,I in statute miles. The lll,lNillllllll [,0-11lilt, Sl'}',tl',l--
[1Oil corlk':_}k_lld:; O]ost'lx" tO tlh' Ill,lXinll|lll .,_:,},,tl'ation di.qt,lllCt, },o:;:;iblo bt,twt'¢n
two I':],'1':_ :;imult,uleou:;lv tra,_:;nlitt inq in the same hi,lh-dcn.<ity mctrol,olitan
,II'O,I, ('._l. , l,o:; .'_llqt'l¢'S,
Flqlll'O !,-_t dt,lllon.qtl',ltt,:; Ill,It tho prol_,lbilitx.' of :;inullI,Inoou.'; trail.';-
, mis.-;ion:" within a h_- to 40-nlile radius is es.-;ontially noql_,llblo, with
; the po:;:;ibl_, exco|,t ion of Iho 1_:; An,lelos (_' -- q.:.2} and bli,lmi /_' --- 44.b)
Ilh'tl'opO[lI,Ill ,ii¢',1:;. AlthotI_lll tho prob,lbility of ,qillltlltallOOtlS tldllsnlis:;iOll.-;
Ill th,'.'_e two ,u',,a,.l is :;till OlI kilt' ordol" of OlI0 txt'l,'ollt, daily and St',hqOIhll
V,II'i,ltiol/:;* could b_" oxpoctt'd tO ilh'l'O,l.';t" tilt' probability Of .';inltllI,Ilh_Otl. "1
t l'all:qlll.q:;{o|l.,_ ill a qiv¢,tl _'t,.ll to a |,t,,lk Vd|tlo Ol/ kilt' Ol'tt¢l" of two tO thl'Of
1,oI ,'ollt.
• 'L'hi.', ,uumal aw, r,tqo thrt,c t,crccllt t,robabl 1 itv st i 11 lu'o\'id_,:; only a
w,rv limited po.,;.-;iblo iulcrlcrc|lce l,etwt,t,n two clo:;clv :;pacod I.:I.'P:_, t,arl ic-
ul,lrly iii \.{t,w of t.h" fact IIhll llh, fil:;t five Illilltl(_'.'; ol t'vl'r%" holll" (,q.
'i';c_" :,tlb:;t','t ion .1. I ..', D,li I':.' v,|ridt loll is _.t,_ ;,_'l'ccllt ,llld :;o,tSO;hll _al'i-
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Pigure 5-8. PROBABILITY OF SIMULTANEOUS TRANSMISSIONSWITHIN SPECIFIED AREAS
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percent of the time) has been set aside for uncontrolled ELT testing. Fur-
ther, since the probability of closely spaced simultaneous transmissions "|
is highest in densely populated areas, one would expect a minimal possJbil- I
ity of adverse impact on SAR operations from a false alarm's masking of an
actual crash. -_
:1
On _he other hand, the probability of simultaneous transmissions from
each ARTCC is significantly higher, as shown in Table 5-3. For example,
there is an 11.6 percent probability that two or more simultaneous alarms "_"
will transmit at a given moment from the Los Angeles ARTCC and a 7.9 per- J
cent probability from New York. These values were derived by Equation 3.
In fact, there is a greater than 60 percent probability that at any I
given time at least two simultaneous ELTS will be transmitting from some
ARTCC. Therefore, to avoid frequent occurrences of spatial ambiguity in i :
locating simultaneous alarms, SARSAT must be capable of distinguishing i
between multiple signals originating from within the same ARTCC .!
• i
• 5.5 ORIGIN OF ELT ALARMS _:
On the basis of the estlmated number of total incidents, 8.4 percent
of the estimated total number of ELT alarms are reported to AFRCC and
ultimately traced to a specific unit. This is a sufficiently large sample
to provide a representative basis for estimating the origins c all alarms,
including those which are not reported.
The sources of ELT signals may be categorized as follows:
• Towered airports (44.7 percent)
• Nontowered airports (37.4 !_ercent)
• All other sources, including crash sites, fields, farms, airborne
equipment, boats, etc. (17.9 percent)
Each of these signal sources is silenced through a combination of severa_
of five different search and rescue scenarios, illustrated in Figure 5-9.
• Scenario i: Incident occurs and ELT is silenced through the use "
: of local resources without being reported to AFRCC.
• Scenario 2: Incident is reported to AFRCC but terminates before
the alarm is loc_ted or a mission is opened.
• Scenario 3: Incident results in an AFRCC mission.
• Scenario 4: Incident at nontowered airport is reported to AFRCC
and is located strictly through the use of local resources without
an AFRCC mission.
• Scenario 5: Incident at a towered airport is reported to AFRCC -
but is located strictly through the use of local resources without
an AFRCC mission.
t
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fjbl, 5-3. PROBABILITY OF SIMULTANEOUS
" TIL'_NSM ISS IONS
Percent Probab]]it>'
of 'ih4ool More
i] ARTCC Simu] tant,ous Ii
ELT Alarms in a
Given Year
!7 Albuquerque '._ IIt
, A_lanta 3.3 [,
Boston 3.l
Ch fcaqo 7. O
i Cleveland 6.2
Denver 2.1 [i
Fort Worth 4.7
#
I _ Houston 5.4
Indianapolis 3. 3
Jacksonville i. 2
Kansas City 4.9
i Los Anqcles 11 6 "
u
Memph is I.9
Miami _.5
• Mi nneal,_ol iS 5.4
;" New York 7.9
- Oakland o. 2
Seattle 4.7
ii Salt I,ak,,City l.q
Washlnqton, D.C. 3.3
Total* 60.7**|,
t
i *Probability that two or molt. }.',I,T._; will b,"transmitting :_imu',taneously in one or
mort, ARTCCs in d qivon ,/oar.
**60.7 percent - l - ;I.[P.(n ,- 1;\_l _-
I , ,
' (1 - 0.03_/_1 - 0.031_
! :... (1 - _.0_)1
" 5-19
!- t
Q
1980004005-078
ithe statistics of Figures 4-8 and 4-9 (Chapter Four) as follows: given
that Figure 4-8 is representative of all alarms, reported and unreported, "[
the total incidents originating at unknown airports are apportioned between ._
towered and nontow6rcd airports according to the ratio of incidents at
towered versus nontowered airports. All nonairport-originated incidents -:
are combined into the "other" category. A similar procedure is used in i
Figure 4-8 to allocate AFRCC missions. As a result, as shown in Figure
5-10, the majority of unreported alarms originate at airports, particularly
_ towered airports. This last statistic will have enormous impact on the "}
cost of ELT alarms and on selecting priorities in the development of solutions. -.
5.6 COST OF ELT ALARMS
5.6.1 Cost-Estimating Methodolog_
This section develops a measure of costs based on the flow chart
presented in Figure 5-9; statistical data derived from AFRCC, FIR, and SAR
, records; and parameter values established through subjective discussions
with SAR officials. Five standard assumptions were used in these
calculations:
• There is a cost involved with every alarm. This cost is measurable
in terms of the resources that could have been used productively
elsewhere but had to be diverted to locating ELTs.
• All unreported incidents are solved solely through the application
of locally available resources.
• Standard costs are applicable across the board as follows:
•. Manpower. One man-year costs include $25,000 in equivalent
salary value, a 50 percent overhead, and 2,000 productive
hours for a burdened rate of $18.75 per hour.
•. Aircraft. Average aircraft operating costs, including fuel,
are $40 per hour.
•. Ground Vehicles. Ground vehicles travel at an average sFeed
of 20 mph durin_ the search process at a cost of $0.17 per
mile, for an hourly cost of $3.40.
• Five possible SAR scenarios exist, as presented in Figure 5-9.
• The distribution of alarm sources described in Figure 5-10 is
applicable to pricing the cost of ELTs.
Each step presented in Figure 5-9 was costed independently. The major
- cost components, as expected, are air and ground searches that use vehicles
L
and aircraft to narrow the initial search area. In fact, while most steps
in the search process typically cost less than $i00 per alarm, the process
of conducting a ground search with vehicles ranged from $109 to $671 over
the five categories. If aircraft are in_'roduced, as in a combination
, 5-20
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air-ground search, the estimated cost increases to $846 per alarm. The
most expensive scenario _at $1,430 per alarm) occur_ when an air search
fails to locate the ELT. In all these scenarios, logistics and record-
keeping costs must also b_ added to the _o_t_ _f any _parcb involved.
5.6.2 Cost Estimates
: Estimated costs (including logistics and recordkeeping) are presented
in Table 5-4. Note that the lowest-cost disposition of an ELT alarm ($74)
occurs when the ELT is terminated prior to any significant field ac ivlty.
This cost includes expenses incurred in AFRCC proces,ing records, coordi-
nating and monitoring activities, and tracking reports. It is representa-
tive of a situation in which the owner discovers the transmitting ELT and
silences it before outside search and rescue persgnnel are dispatched.
The next level of expense occurs with unreported alarms. Typicall_,
the alarm originates in the vicinity of experienced personnel who can
quickly proceed on foot and silence the transmlssion source. Thus only a
, few personnel are ir_olved for only a short period, thereby limiting costs
to $83 per alarm.
There are situations, however, when silencing cannot be accomplished
by local personnel alone because the source of the transmission is harder
to pinpoint. In particular, if the signal cannot be localizeJ quickly to
an airport, AFRCC assistance is requested. This request inrolves additional
personnel to coordinate the search pcocess; there£ore, the cost of silencing
increases to $139.
If the source still cannot be located, the local SAR teams may be
dispatched to the suspected area to ]ocat_ the signal source, driving the
cost of disposition per transmission to $414.
There could also be situations in which the location of the signal
sou_ce is not known with sufficient accuracy to permit dispatching lecal
SAR t_,ams. In such situations, AFRCC initiates an air search. The
estimated $1,128 cost per mission is nearly three times that of the most
expensive ground search.
t
t
Silencing alarms at nontowered airports requires the most cesources,
both individually and overall. Two factors account for t:.is situation:
First, locating signal sources at nontowered airports requires the apl_li-
cation of a disproportionate number of AFRCC-coordinated missions_ Secono,
the local search procedures are more complex than for towered airports.
5.7 CAUSES OF ALARMS
The Service Difficulty Reports provide a statistically adequate sample
of the causes of false alarms. In 1978 only about 12 Dercent of the causes
identified were in the human error and misuellaneous categories (see Cnapt:r
Four, Fi_ e 4-10). G-switch problems hay% ]ccounted for a reasonab!
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constant 40 [_rcent of all alarms during the past several years and will
'- probably continue at a comparable level in the forseeable future. All the
I remaining alarms resulted from battery-corrosion-related effects, which havedemonstrated a dramatic increase during the past five years. Approximately
=.2 Fercent o" all alarms in 1978 were attributed to batheLy-related
I phenomena.%
!
T,_b2c ",--2 i srINATt D _ v >T t t : :,1' A:.AkY,>
Source uf .o:_t or Percent of
-qcenai to He'..l.ocated Ala, _i Total Total c'ost
:;lqndl
, (Doll.- "s) Alarm..
Towered '_7" 44. -** ,'_34.7"*
A irport(44.7
l,ercent)
l Unreportca ,q _ 3 q. _ ',,,',. ,ql ? EIA term-qatc 74 o. 3 '_,_. 1
3 AFRCC, rn_s.';lon 1, 12S O. b 10:_. '_
.m 5 Af'F','C, no 1 _9 2._, 6°. n
1111 ";".IOil
N,mtowert, I 14q* _7. q** I,t)4t).I**
A_, |'oft
1_7.4
' percent )
l Unrt,ported ,q _ 2S.(, 4_,0.0
! I<I,T tormlnatt, 74 q.1 -',..' '13 %f'RCC, ml,,,,l,m 1,12,q 1.(, _4_..1
1 AI'FC(', n,, .t14 2. 1 16).S
Ill 1 :-5; 1 , _I1
h • oth,'r-_, I _ ,* 17. 7** ,11,1.q*_
i]7.9
l,cxcoIIt )
l 1 [,,_rcported H _ 13. _ 221..?
' 2 EI,q' terminate 74 2. 5 _5. _
AFR('(', mtssion 1,12_, 0.(, 1 _O.,,
4 AFR('_" no .ll.l l () 29.9
# q
ml '.;% 1 oll
l
•Avt'r,lqi'for qroul,.
• *Total for q,'ouI,.
t
The st_';.isti, al indications are that the technical causes of alarmq
(e.g., battery corrosion) are .4ndependent of location (e.g., towered
: I airports). Therefore, a two-dimensional matrix can be readily constructed| to break aown the or (_in of alarms with teclmlcal cause of alarms. This
'J' I 5-25
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: matrix, presented in Tabh, 5-5, ident, fies tile maximum benefits achievable
by entirely eliminatinq causes or sources of alarms throu, lh tile application _.
of overlaFplnq qoals.
, in tilL" examillatlon ot possible techIlical solution::, tile hiqh co.';t.,;
associated with problems due to battery corrosion art, noticed inmledlat,,ly.
Most of these alarms cart be expocted to disapi,ear as .i result of the ,.
recent Airworthiness Directlve to removo l,i-SO.,batte:-ies from El/l's. The
replacement batteries presumably will not be ,:ubject to this problem. 'l'i_t....
only other major technical problem associatt,d with false alarms is tile
G-switch. Improvinq this component could reduc," false alarms by more than
7,000 annually, for d savinq of $870,000 to the aviation community.
Table 5-5. CAUSES AND SOURCES OF ELT ALARMS
Alarm Statistics b\" Cause of Alarm* ..
Source of
Alarm Battery lluman Error -G-Swit ch . and Tota 1
| ['c)r ro:; lOI1 . . .
MI sce 1 1 anoous
Towered lb. 5% 22.,q% 5.4! 4-I.7%
Airport 31qO 4400 1040 ,q630
$308. S $425.7 $i00.2 $834.7
..
Nontowdred 13.8% 19. I% 4.q% 37.4%
Airport 2660 3690 870 7__0
$ 388. '2 $535.0 $I 25.9 $1,04'_. i
Other b.7% 9.1% 2.1% ]7.9%
1290 17t, O .llO _460
$173.0 $238.4 $56.1 $467.5
Total 37% 51% 12% 100%
7140 9840 "2320 Iq, 300
$870.0 $I,199.1 $282.2 $2,351. _ i
/ Possible Benefits of
/ *Percent of total annual incidont.*;.
Number of annual incidents.
/ Annual cost per cause/source catcqory [
L in thousands of dollars. I
Compared with tho G-switch dnd batterx., coI'losion p,'oblenl:;, bl'oadc,lst:_
re.qtl.' t inq fl'Olll htlman etrOl" and othor mi Joe I Ialh'OIlS C,IIlSeS sholl I d bt, t t i Vt'll I
]ow-}',t'iority tl'eatnlent bocall.qe of tho sllkill t,xpect-t'd l_elh'fit. I
1980004005-085
For solutions based on the oriqins of al,lrm._, nontowcrod ,ilIpolt:;
? must be first-priority candidate,.: for corroctivt, action bt,cau._c of the,
| hiqh cost of silencin¢! alarms at ttu, s_, airpolts (due both to the larqe
4
number of such ,il,lrm< .!!!d t'? the hi,lI_ _o.-,I _,t- locatinq t',hh oflclldt,r).
Towt, red alrp¢,rt.-; oxt,cI it, lice more alarms, but the co.-.t ,_f tt'rMllhltiOh
1 pOf alarm is :;iqn_ficantly low,,r th,ln .it TIotltowt'I't',t ,lil}'oI't:; .iIhi thtl:;l tho t'Xpoct¢,| b¢'Ih'flt I:; sIll,Illt'I', IPakllhl this :;OtllCt' of ::i,Ilhll.': .1 :;t','oild-
priority irom.
I All othor sources of EI,T si_u,al:_, in_-ltld.inq ,ictual crashes, collt:i-
, bute only 50 perc:..nt as many alarms a:; towered .tirik_rt-__. The co.,_t of
511OIICiIlq Ollt" OI- thesl' siqn.]l.'; is about the" sam," ,Is for a siqnal flolll .i
nontowored but the of is low. Thus tlh're
,li r_,ort, },os:;tbi 1 i t_
seo-,q to bo littl_, lI1COIlti%,t" to k'Otl:;itlt'! ['ro,'t',llllt':; tol It'dllCill,l tllt,:;t •
r,,ma iilin,l alarms.
I
I
!
I
!
.
4
w
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CHAPTER SIX
APPROACHES TO REDUCING ELT FALSE ALARMS
i
This chapter develops a goEls structure and implementation plan matrix
- for alleviating the present ELT false alarm problem. It describes a specific
_ strategy based on the effectiveness and utility of the available tools.
7
i _ 6.1 GOALS
A systematic approach to correcting the present ELT problem must focus
on the achievement of two overall goals:
• Reducing the number of false alarms
• Reducing the impact on SAR operations of all remaining alarms
Each of these two objectives may be achieved by satisfying one or more
of the subgoals illustrated in Figure 6-1. For example, the number offalse alarms may be reduced by solving existing ELT t chnical problems,
preventing the occurrence of new problems, or eliminating the occurrence
i of repeated problems. Each of these subgoals in turn may be used to estab-
lish objectives for proposed programs.
I 6.2 MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS
- Some priority objectives contribute more toward the overall goals
_ I than others and thus are more significant than others. The significance of
_i each be described quantitatively in terms of the maximum
objectivem can
possible saving that could be realized by total accomplishment of that
priority objective alone. _.
Consider, for example, Priority Objective ill in Figure 6-i (modify _
ELT Li-SO 2 battery). Figure 5-10 (Chapter Five) indicates that 51 percent
_'_ i of all ELT false alarms are the result of battery-related problems There-
'" _ fore, if all battery-related problems were completely resolved, 51 percent _
of all alarms (or 9,840 alarms) would be eliminat6d. This reduction in
i alarms corresponds to a saving of $1,199,100, for an average of $121 peralarm, i_
Y
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Consider Priority Objective 212 in Figure 6-1 (se]f-detect and silence
alarms at towered airports). If all the alarm' at towered airports could
be detected by the aircraft operator, then all the alarms currently located Q
at towered airports through AFRCC involvement (Scenarlos 2 and 4, Table
5-4) would become, under optimum conditions, alarms that terminate before
being located (Scenario 3). Net savings, therefore, may be calculated as I
$134,500 on the basis of the cost difference between AFRCC-assisted
searches and those searches for which the ELT terminates.
6.2.1 Maximum Possible Savinqs per Plan I
The goals structure illustrated in Figure 6-1 describes priority T
oDjectives whose achievement will help to reduce the false alarm problem !
and presents estimates of the maximum savings possible from achievement
of each objective. However, this goals structure does not describe how _.
these objectives could be achieved. As a result 33 specific implementation
plans were developed, each of which would accomplish one or more priority
of objectives. The maximum possible saving attributable to any single
implementation plan is equal to the total of all the savings that could be
realized from achievement of the specific priority objectives that plan
satisfies. The plans considered and the priority objectives that each sat-
isfies are presented in matrix form in Figure 6-2. Consider, for example,
Plan 1.4 (include source signature in ELT transmissions). Such a signature
embedded in the emergency broadcast would expedite locating all signals
from towered airports, nontowered airports, and nonairport sites. Plan 1.7
(connect ELT to anti-collision strobe on aircraft), however, would assist
in locating oDiy those signals which originate from airports. The maximum
possible saving from Plan 1.4, therefore, is the total of the savings attri-
butable to Priority Objectives 213, 223, and 233. For Plan 1.7, only the
savings from Priority Objectives 213 and 223 are included.
6.2.2 Probability that Plan Will Achieve Savinqs
There are three mitigating factors that may prevent a particular imple-
mentation plan from meeting its priority objectives completely:
i. The ability of a plan to satisfy performance goals is limited by
' the portion of the total possible population it can reach and the
extent to which it can solve tl.e priority objectives for that
population set.
2. No plan is assured of success if implemented; therefore, a cer- _,
tain amount of technical risk is involved in adopting any partic-
ular plah.
t
3. Some plans may be more acceptable to the user community than others
and thus more likely to be successful.
w
6- 2
, /
1980004005-088
I
!
!
Alleviab
Impact o
False AIAZ
i I_
1
; _educe Number
i Coal. of A1a_l /
I . I I
Solve Prevent Prevent
_Is Existinq New Repeat
PrOblems Probl_ Problems
; ; ; | 1 1 F-
;l_lify EL? I Monitor Penalize I Reward
Priority Objectimes Li-SOI [ Modify ELT Collect Manufacturer Modzfy Reports and
or F_u _pment [ Designs FindsBattery I G-Switch Data Offenders
-- I J L l t !Savinqs -- --I s_aource= save_! I -- _ _---__----i F---- --! r--.-.- _- "" --I _- .....
"" I _ I l , I I I I I
I xml_ror'ELI'r.lael I 51t I I 37t I I 12t I I 12t I I ;of l I 20t I I 5t
I ala_ E1iai.,at_lI I I l I I I I I I I I I I
I _luivalen: wlue I I 1,199.1 I I 870.0 I I 282.2 I I 282.2 I I 470.3 I I 470.3 I I
I ($ Thounn_) It L J L .J ! _1 L ____/ I I | J I_.t 153.3
_' ' ruLuv_' /; Figure 6-i. GOAL STRUCTURE FC
I
, .'i_CEDING PAGECLJ_,';:''.=
i PRECEDINQPAGEBLANKNOT
.......... _q
1980004005-089
I A] levlate /
I_t of
PaT,se A18_
l 1(oo)Reduce Impactof =A an_
|
1Locate Alaz_ts at _ [Locate AIa_ at Locabe All
i_ered Azzpor_sI J _onto_erea Ot_mrAI_
Fauu_r
l Faster J I Airports Faster
Reward [ Self-Detect Identify I Reward Self-Detect Location _ports and J Self-Detect Location
:,ol I I sl I I __ I I __ I s_. I I -- I I ._ ] I st I Ii "" I I -- I
I U I I I I I I I I I I I i I I I I I
r4_0.3 I ! I I I I ""4,0 II zs3.3 I I 134.5 I I z95.4 I I 220.8 I I 463.3 I I 513z I I zs_.7 I I z87.6
----J t_ .In / L_ 0 I. _J L .... J I J I. I c_..... J I _l
Log_md
• 20 porcont o! dcenarios 3 and S
• CAll Scanarlos 3 and S folmd via s_marlo 2
tall alaram found vi_ Scmlario 2
"1"1"20 perc._nt of $cenarioa 3 and 4
#All Scenarioc _ and 4 foumd via S©_io _.
GOAL STRUCTURE FOR SOLVING ELT PROBLEM
1980004005-090
• ] I:l,,,,. .I, t,v,.///d)//// / /
q_ l.l Remove L_-SO_ batter_,,_ _ 1.199
l 2 haove all _-SwL_C_eS • 87O
3 I_Jove dmfect_v_ 3-z_tch_s ,,-I, • B70
l 4 Include source _dentlt_cat_or _l_'u:e _,
zLx_,....,..,o. for_ • • • 9;_
i I.' |nclud¢ Uos|t_on _nfo_tlon _n LLT tr4n_-
1.6 Install "ELT transact" indlcat_r :_ _, x, :.
_f aL_crarc • • • _6_
a*rczaft • • 739
• l _ Install c_cky*t-acL, ss_th contr,,l .w*t.
: testing • _
) _qulre fx_d-base % ,:at_:. _, n,_" " _, _, t
2 4 Provxde r_ards fo: r.,.rtx. ,_d lo,.,.,_;
or "_If"
7 Dt_ar_ ,-_w_ _ on ,ark,'l a_r.raft
8 Dtsar_ J-avltc_ at all _*_ _na_i_t
acttvate £LT *_ ,'_ r;rr, c5 • 870
em_i lency fr, ;3.n _,g • lq'.
L2 Assess eX_tlnrs ,¢'naltl,. i , rg_ r+,, _,
of _endcrs • 47C
[_¢atton _:¢,qram at _,,.(. t _r, r_' , ,' _- • • ?53
'"'4 Eqtabhsh conttnuln; f_l i q,_mI 1*_,, ,r i
*" t_stxnq program • • %4
9.% _,,rfn_ a nonrecurr_n_ I_, ii ..:r_ hn: ,._
t,,st *rig ;,rex; ram • • 564
).6 Perforra a ln_nt qov,,r_ent manufactur*_,
Igudy oE ELT dOSlqn and r. h_lht t _ • 3.104
J,7 D_veloI,nontarlff, nat*oMll_ _*form
"'_ t_cket:n't I rocedur_ with mandat_r5 , err. _- • • • _.257tlon for nfronders
4. I lnclud_ £LT ol_rat*nq and u_., i roo,,lur,,s _rL • •
p|lot tra*nznq and crrtlf_,at_o_ i r,_;_am_ • • • • 1,70e
"4'.2 Ira?foment a matntrna_ce V,'r_,m:,,'lI T
a_arcness _roqram • 2_2
_" 4.3 rrovxde da_ly remlndrrs nf },LT i,r(_blt, r_ _'
,._ v,lo,, • • • • • l.?0_
4.4 D*str_but_ FLT alarm report,, tn ._m]fact .r_ rq _ • • 753
.___ _,5 Include a "check £LT" at_ t, tn a_r_raft _nu-
[acturers' reco_n,l*.d prefhght ,ind I,(mt-
% I £It_blzIh EhT signal _-t,,ctxnn and notlfl_.t-
_09tlon at azrlort_ i
5.2 Dimtrgbut_ DPS to SAR o_gan1?atlonq f_tr _,re I --
ext_ms*v_ use durtng search el,rear _ons • • J _09
5.3 amaum_ that all qrQund°detrcted _LT q_,;nal_
i orlglnate at airport nf recept*, n • • 709
5,4 Develop "model" SAh i rocedur, _ [_z nat l_,nal
use that 111ust at , nptlm,tm #],l,zo_(hre) • 9_locating and a*l.a_inq ELls
_already In _avings calculation,
!
Figure 6-2. MATRIX OF PRIORITY OBJECTIVES SATISFIED BY IMPLEMENTATION PLANS
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6.2.3 Net Expected Annual Savings
The three mitigating factors described above were quantified in terms
of low (0.2), medium (0.5), high (0.8), and very high (0.95) probabilities
and were included in the evaluation of each plan in Section 6.3. The net
expected annual saving resulting from each plan's implementation is simply
the product of the maximum possible saving, the probability of the plan to
satisfy performance goals, the probability of technical risks involved,
and the probability of the plan's acceptance by the user community.
e
6.2.4 Cost of Implementation
Each implementation plan will require the application of some new
.|
resources. These resources may be (i) additional Government expenditures
for regulatory and administrative machinery or for technical implementa- !
tion studies, or (2) extra expenditures by the aviation community. Very
coarse estimates of these resources were developed for each plan on the
|
basis of present costs.
, 6.2.5 Pa_back Period
q
The measure of the net desirability of any investment is return on
investment. If t'_e estimated costs of implementation are considered as
"the investment" and the estimated annual savings as the "return" on that
investment, the relative effectiveress of the various proposals can be
evaluated in terms of payback period in years. The shorter the payback,
the more effective and desirable the plan.
6.2.6 Implementation Time and Break-Even Point
In addition, a plan does not become fully effective and operational
immediately upon implementation. Some plans with very short payback peziods
may re,fire as long as I0 years or more to become full_' effective. For
example, replacement of all present ELTs with perfect units would reFult
in a relatively short payback period. If replacement took place through
attrition, however, the plan would require i0 years or more to purge all
existing units in the field and become fully effective. Thus the initial
break-even point approximately equals the sam of the implementation time
and payback period.
4
_. These impoztant characteristics of the different possible corrective
actions will be discussed in greater detail in the following sections.
6.3 CORRECTIVE ACTION APPROACHES
_ Five general program approaches have been identified:
• ELT modifications
• Regulatory actions
• Administrative actions
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• Education
• , • Improved SAR procedures
ELT modifications basically address the underlying technical causes of false
" alarms. Improved SAR procedures accept the inevitable existence of false
alarms and attempt to mitigate their impact by reducing the resources
required to locate each alarm. The other three programs attempt to treat
the symptoms of the underlying technical causes and simultaneously stream-
line SAR procedures through participation of the aviation community.
6.3.1 ELT Modification Program
The intuitively obvious approach to eliminating all false alarms is to
redesign offending equipment. Such a program would provide the ultimate
resolution of all problems experienced to date. Unfortunately, an ELT
modification program has some significant hidden disadvantages that may {
offset its desirability, t
!
First, the aviation community is disinclined to spend additional money _!
' to modify or replace equipment involuntarily purchased to begin with.
Second, wholesale equipment modifications and replacements are likely to
result in severe technical dislocations and new unexpected problems. Third,
should a technically acceptable set of modifications be developed, the
logistics of effective implementation could prove to be difficult, and
perhaps unpopular, and probably would require many years to accomplish.
Finally, even a simple modification program costing $50 per ELT will be
too expensive for cost-effectiveness, since
$I0,000,000 Total
$50 per ELT × (approximately 200,000 ELTs) = Modification Cost
Eight specific implementation plans are considered and summarized in
Table 6-1. Analysis confirms the above observations on the cost-effectiveness
of hardware-oriented short-term solutions. Note that Plan i.i essentially
J has been accomplished through FAA Airworthiness Directive (AD) 79-05-02.
This AD required the removal within 30 days of all Li-SO 2 batteries from
ELTs in U.S.-registered civil aircraft. The only other plan that has a
reasonably short k0.3 year) break-even period is Plan 1.3 (remove defective
' G-switches only). This implementation plan would tend to have a compara-
tively high user compliance rate because the few different types of offend-
. ing components could be replaced through a mandatory Airworthiness Directive
prGcess similar to thaL used for Li-SO2 batteries.
6.3.2 Regulatory Program
The succes_ cf the ELT concept depends on the performance of the equip-
ment, SAR crc_, e.ficiency, and the participation of the aviation community.
This co_nunity con_ists of individuals with a variety of needs. The easi-
' est, most effective, and most rapid technique for assuring cooperation from
_, such a diverse population Js regulauo, f action. Regulatory action succeede_
in accomplishing, over strenuous objections, the installatiol of more than
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!140,000 ELTs in civil aircraft in less than a year. By the same token,
regulatory action through issuance of an AD will result in removal of
Li-SO2 batteries from all ELTs within a p_riod of 30 days from publication.
(Removal of the batteries does not solve the problem, howcver, and a tech-
nical solution will not be accomplished until at leas_ one year after the
AD's publication)
Regulatory action does have some disadvantages, however. Enactment
is frequently a difficult, time-consuming process. The regulation cannot
expedite the implementation process itself, which may be time-limited by
other factors. Frequently, public reaction is negative. Finally, com-
pliance with a regulation is not assured unless the _upporting regulatory
and administrative machinery is properly installed. Therefore, the applica-
tion of regulatory solutions must be considered with utmost care.
Nine possible regulatory plans are summarized in Table 6-2. Most of
these plans, particularly those which do not demand the establishment of
a significant new administrative structure, demonstrate viable short- to
medium-term effectiveness against ELT false alarms. Approaches to disarm.
or deactivate G-switches (Plans 2.7 and 2.8) seem to hold particularly|
bright prospects for success within a period of about three years. Plan
2.2 (require pilots _o monitor emergency bands before takeoffs and after
landings) also can be expected to break even within about four years of
adoption. Probably the most attractive features of both of these plans
are as follows:
• • No aviation community cash outlay i3 demanded.
, • No significant Government enforcement machinery is needed for the
plans to work.
One of the plans (Plan 2.9, specify new types of automatic crash sensors
for second-generation ELTs) holds promise for long-terra solutions. The
attractiveness of this plan rests partly in the high failure rate of G-
switches and partly in the fact that present equipment specifications
mention ai'ernative crash-sensing techniques (e.g., oil pressure sensors)
- but do not consider them to a level of detail adequate for manufacturers
to apply in prnduction units. Correcting this pre' "em should encourage
- manufacturers to apply alternative, more reliable technologies to triggering
, ' ELTs.
6.3.3 Administrative Pz_gram
i The objective of regulatory action can fr£quently be accomplished
through less drastic measures, particularly if the administrative and
regulatory machinery already exist. For example, the FAA and FCC alreadyare permitted to take sp cific punitive actions against indlviduals who
' use the emergency airwaves for nonemezgency purposes. These punitive
' _ actions may range from "red tagging" of an aircraft by the FAA to imposing
] a fine or revocation of station license by the FCC.
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ITherefore, more c_nscientious administrat_ _n of existing regulations
and the addition of new internal proceaures within the FAA and FCC can
provide the aviation co.7_nunity adaitional incentive to re_, _ the number
and duration of false alarms. This administrative approach has _he advan-
tage of being comparatively easy to implement and control, wlth _el;'tively
_ ; little public awareness and short lead times.
Seven specific im_lementatlon plans are summarized in Table 6-3.
Although the implementation costs of these plans are compazative!v low,
only four provide sufficient expected savings to offset even these low
costs. Of these four possible candidates, Plan 3.3 (e-ablish production
sampling and recer_ification program at manufacturer's plants) recuires
long _ime to full implementation because only newly manufactured units fall
under the sampling program, leaving a large number of defective ELTs in the
fie]d during a slow attrition process. The most desirable administrative
plan appears to be Plan 3.7 (develop nationally uniform nontariff ticketing
procedure with mandatory corrective action for offenders). Th_s plan would
permit SAR or FAA personnel to issue citations to aircraft that emit ELT
false alarms. Copies of the citation would be sent to the FAA at Oklahoma
City and to AFRCC. The aircraft owner would be required to submit an £L_
, inspection and test certificate by an authorized serviceman withir 30 da_s.
Noncompliance would result in revocation of the aircraft's airworthiness
certificate. This process is conceived to be similar to the citations
frequently issued by police to autonobiles for safety defects, such as
nonworking headlights. A significant consequence of the pv()gram would be
the establishment of a central data control center in which ELT false
alarms and performance could be monitored readily. This data uontrol
center all.ady exist., by virtu_ of the FAA Service Difficulty Report daZa
base, which should be relatively inexpersive to augment.
A second desirable administrative plan could be Plan 3.5, a ella-time
field sampling and testing program to collect operational veri'_ication d_ta
on existing units and to confirm or deny the make or model d_stribut_ons
developed during this study. This plan could be useful in identifying
specific regulatD;y or technical corrective action plans and in providing
the required support for future Airworthiness Dire,:tives.
6.3.4 Educational Program
An expanded educational progra_ wi_.l not necessarily prevent many
; false alarms, because the number of alarm_ directly attributable to human
-: error and miscellaneous cadses has been decreasing However, an educa-
tional program can be an _nvaluable tool for reducing was , of S_R resources
in locating false ELT alarms. For example, an aircraft _?_rat_r wh_ is
trained to monitor anM _nspect his ELT regularly could prob:_l} prevent the
launching of a search mxssion by notifying proper authorit_.es more promptly.
Proper training of airport and SAr _ersonnel to report all incidepts
promptly and conscientiously also %ould permit compilation of a more com-
plete and accurate data base from which undesirable trenas could be identi-
fied and arrested before they mushroomed into major _.roblems.
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Educational programs imply a certain amount of voluntary compliance
after training activities are completed. Thus it is reasonable to expect
that recommended practices would be less universally adopted than those i_i
" _I imposed by regulatory and administrative programs. On the other hand,
, educational programs preclude the strong negative reactions typically
associated with regulations and the limited awareness of administrative
actions.
I Five specific implementation plans are summarized in Table 6-4.Because of the relat ve y low cost of educational programs nd the possible
broad population range of targets, most educational programs appear to be
i good candidates for adoption. In fact, the only proposed plan with greaterthan a three-year break-even point is Plan 4.2 (implement maintenance per-
i', sonnel ELT awareness program). The primary reason for this program's
_ 9 comparatively long (8.3 years) payback period is that the FAA already use_
notices and advisory circulars as an ELT awareness program. However, we
i have not been able to determine the program's aggressiveness, level of
detail, and effectiveness, and believe that improvements are possible.
i!| 6.3.5 Streamline SAR Operations
I _nother possible method for reducing the cost of false alarms is toimprove SAR procedures so that ELT alarms are easier to locate and silence.
I 5treamlinJnq SAR operations can minimize waste of resources. Unfortunately,SAR operating procedures are too varied to permit the development of many
I comprehensive plans for streamlining operations. However, several possible
i approaches have been identified; these are presented in Table 6-5w
_ The first two approaches attempt to reduce the cost of localizing
S alarms by improving the efficiency of search operations with the aid of
additional equipment. Plan 5.1 considers the application of devices that
i i automatically detect apd report the existence of alarms at unattended air-
ports. The concept is somewhat similar to a burglar alarm connected to
the local police station. Plan 5.2 considers the benefits and costs of
providing additional direction finders to search and rescue organizations
I for use during the localizing process. Both plans require the purchase of
a significant quantity of new equipment and thus provide only medium-rangebreak-even on the order of four to seven years.
I Another possible approach (Plan 5.3) is based on the savings to be
realized by substituting many local airport searches for each air or
_ ground search. For example, all ground-detected alarms could be assumed
I to originate at the airport from which the report of the alarm was received.
i_ I Then a search team could be dispatched directly to that airport without
an air or ground search. Unfortunately, the additior, al efforts expended
in chasing down alarms that are reported from one airport but are actually
located elsewhere far outweigh the expected saving from eliminating air
or ground searches.
I Plan 5.4 follows an approach commonly practiced by the Federal Govern-
ment in other areas. Since SAR operations are decentralized, many different
procedures exist for locating and silencing ELTs. Each of these special
I procedures offers unique benefits that may be applied by other jurisdictions,
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but these "optimum" procedures have not been compiled into a unified recom-
mended approach. Therefore, significant savings could be realized through
the publication of search and rescue operating guidelines &nd standards to qO
be applied at the local level. These guidelines would not be mandatory
(and loc_lities should not be penalized for not adopting them completely), _.
but they should provide assistance and coordination in minimizing the impact
of ELT false alarms. ""
6.4 CORRECTIVE ACTION STRATEGY -.
Fifteen of the 33 specific implementation plans discussed will con-
tribute significantly to solving the ELT false alarm problem within the
next 15 years. Of course, not all of these can be implemented; e-en if
all fifteen were fully implemented, many of the plans would not be as *.
cost-effective as indicated because of overlaps in coverage. The plans
designed to reduce the impact of alarms are especially vulnerable in this ""
regard.
Therefore, it is important to develop a unified corrective action .,
strategy that considers interactive effects. Such a strategy is outlined
in the following subsections in approximate sequence of recommended -"
implementation.
°,
6.4.1 _ccomplished Plans
Plan i.I (remove Li-SO2 batteries) has already been accomplished •
through AD 79-05-02, as discussed earlier. The net effect is expected to
be a 37 percent reduction in the total number of false alarms.
6.4.2 Short-Term Break-Even Strategy
The following four implementation plans promise short-term break-
even in a period less than three years from adoption:
• Distribute ELT Alarm Reports to Manufacturers (Plan 4.4). Plan 4.4
is essentially a "no cost" action that could result in an expected
5 percent reduction in the number of alarms as manufacturers up-
grade designs on the basis of the failure reports received.
: • Develop Nationally Uniform Nontariff Ticketing Procedure with
Mandatory Corrective Action for Offenders (Plan 3.7). Plan 3.7 is
a low-cost option that would increase pilot awareness of the neces-
sity of maintaining ELTs in good operating condition, would prevent .
repeat offenders, and would offer a reliable data base for managing
: the ELT problem. Savings are expected to be a i0 percent maximum
' b
_i reduction in alarms and a I0 percent saving in SAR resources. .i
i • Provide Daily Reminders of ELT Problems to Pilots (Plan 4.3). This• educational program, utilizing both printed and recorded materials, _
promises to reduce the waste of time and resources by 5 percent in .!
| searching for false alarms.
i
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• Require Pilots to Monitor Emergency Bands Before Takeoffs and After
i Landings (Plan 2.2). Pilot self-detection of ELT false alarm signalsand more rapid fixing of transmission sources will reduce the waste
of SAR resources by an estimated 6 percent.
l Break-Eve 9 Strategy
6.4.3 Medium-Term
Six implementation plans could achieve break-even within three to six
] years after adoption. Two of the six plans are somewhat similar and are
8 discussed together. The others are addressed separately.
_ • Deactivate G-Switch (Plan 2.7 or 2.8). Since armed G-switches are
the second most populous cause of false alarms, disarming ELTs while
the aircraft is parked (or at all times except in case of emergency)
_ is expected to provide an 8 to 12 percent reduction in the totalI number of false alarms. The exact reduc ion will vary depending on
the particular implementation plan adopted. Additional information
must be developed before this plan can be adopted successfully.
I First, what are pilot reactions to the possibility of having to
• worry about one more item (e.g., activating the ELT) during an
emergency? Second, how accessible are currently installed units
I and controls? These questions can be resolved as part of theI sampling and testing program discussed next.
• Distribute DFs to SAR Organizations for More Extensive Use During
i _ Search Operations (Plan 5.2). Many searches currently are conducted
• _ without the aid of adequate direction-finding equipment. Recent
technology advances have made available accurate, inexpensive direc-
tion finders for use in air and ground searches. In fact, the FAA
ha_ been such to aid in search and
purchasing equipment rescue
operations. The procurement and distribution for use by SAR orga-
i nizations of more DF equipment will reduce the cost of SAR opera-
i ) tions by approximately 5 percent.
w
• Perform a Nonrecurring Field Sampling and Testing Program (Plan
_ -- 3.5). The results of this program would be used to identify and
_ remove from service specific units with documented defects. As
: _ a result, one p_rcent of all false alarms would be prevented from
: recurring.
T • Include ELT Operatirg and Use Procedures in Pilot Training andd Certification Programs (Plan 4.1). Plan 4.1 would complement two
short-term approaches (Plans 4.3 and 2.2). Its effectiveness
w T would be derived from the classroom setting during initial pilot-
_ licensing procedures and from the mandatory examination of all
pilots every two years. In combination with the other medium-term
T break-even plans, this approach is expected to reduce somewhat the
_;_ _ total number of alarms by reinforcing the goals of the other two
programs and also to reduce wasted SAR resources by approximately
three percent.
?-
]. ° Develop "Model" SAR Procedures for National Use That Illustrate
Optimum Approaches to Locating and Silencing ELTs (Plan 5.4). Plan
_" I" 5.4 would take advantage of the experience gained in the more
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successful jurisdications (e.g., Alaska, California, Washington)
to streamline SAR procedures in other localities. Estimated SAR -:
resources saved nationall_ would be in the range of two to three
percent of present comm _ _ents. "
6.4.4 Long-Term Break-Even Strategy
The aggressive adoption of short- and medium-term break-even strategies
should result in a 60 percent reduction in _he number of alarms and an -" •
additional 14 percent saving in wasted SAR resources. Quantifying the
effects of longer-termstrategies is more difficult. Major changes to
the ELT concept are expected to occur in the 6- to 15-year period. These
changes include the introduction of new, second-generation ELTs with higher
• reliability and lower false alarm rates, the launching of SARSAT with its "
more accurate position-fixing capabilities, and perhaps even the introduc-
tion of third-generation 406 MHz ELTs. The following plans provide some
possibilities for additional improvements:
• Remove Defective G-switches (Plan 1.3). The medium-term strategy
undoubtedly missed some defective G-switches because of the lack
of user community interest. It is estimated that a rigorously
enforced ELT modification program could provide an additional
modest reduction in the total number of false alarms, but at great
cost.
• Specify Alternate Types of Automatic Crash Sensors for Second-
Generation ELTs (Plan 2.9). The deactivation of G-switches may
provide an effective interim solution to the false alarm problem.
There is, however, considerable uncertainty regarding the necessity
for automatic triggers and the mechanisms that should be used for
reliably sensing crashes. NASA is currently studying the forces
involved in aircraft crashos to define G-switch parameters. Other
sensing techniques, such as combinations of engine condition,
acceleration, deformation sensors, etc., may provide a more reli-
able indicator of emergency and should be considered seriously.
The potential exists for eliminating more than 25 percent of all -
false alarms through adoption of this plan.
.i
• Implement a Maintenance Personnel ELT Awareness Program (Plan 4.2).
Minimal benefits are expected. -.
• Automatic Signal Detection and Notification at Airports (Plan 5.1). .
: Given the present statistics of ELT false alarms, an additional
three percent of SAR resources could be saved by automatic signal "I
detection and notification. However, the prospect of increasing .!
: spatial resolution through SAP.SAT, the introduction of the new
: generation of ELTs, and the _plementation of short- and medium- -
term strategies cast serious doubts on the value of this plan. I
• "_
"V
i
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il CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This chapter presents the conclusions and recommendations resulting
from this study and addresses critical in_ediate steps necessary to imple-
ment the strategies developed in Chapter Six.
T
7.1 CONCLUSIONS
d
This study indicates that the problem of ELT false alarms has not dis-
_" appeared -- only the causes have changed. It is estimated that in 1978
6. there were about 19,300 false alarms, the equivalent of one in every i0
units triggering unnecessarily. This rather high and disturbing figure is
v seasonal and depends heavily on the estimate of the number of unreported
false alarms, which are considered to constitute more than 75 percent of
g.
all alarms. Even at this high level of false alarms, the expected average
of 6.5 simultaneous emissions is well under the anticipated capacity of
SARSAT.
Most false alarms can be traced to problems with the G-switch or the
Li-SO 2 battery. Since these two major causes of false alarms represent prob-lems with the units thems lves rather th n with their envi onment, the rate
of ELT alarms should be roughly proportional to the concentration of units
in the field. This situation implies that the areas with the highest number"! of aircraft (i.e., Los Angeles, New York, and Miami metropolitan areas) are
the source of the highest density of false alarms. For any given metropol-
itan area, the maximum probability of two or more simultaneous emissions is
" I estimated to be three percent. Thus the possibility of a false signal mask-
i I ing a true one exists, but this should be a fairly uncommon occurrence.
Most false alarms occur at airports -- approximately 45 percent at
towered airports and 37 percent at nontowered airports. The remainder
include boat-related incidents (EPIRBs), farms, legitimate crashes, and
T other miscellaneous sources. Alarms originating from nontowered airports
_ I are the most expensive to locate and silence because these fields lack rou-
"_ tine monitoring of emergency frequencies. Therefore, the elimination ormor rap d locati n of alarms at airports should b a first pr ority f
[ proposed solutions.
!
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The average transmissien duration for a false alarm is about three
hours; however, it is considerably shorter for those alarms which originate
at towered airports and longer for those which originate at nontowered air- -_
ports. This transmission duration is dependent not only on the location of
the alarm but also on the method used to locate the alarm. Therefore, some -"
savings in SAR resources may be achieved through streamlining SAR procedures. .,
--.
; i
7.2 RECOMMENDATIONS
it
A number of technical and nontechnical short-term solutions are avail-
able to correct the causes of problems with ELTs. The most promising of
these solutions employ educational and regulatory programs involving manu- -.
facturers and active pilots. These short-term solutions, however, will
provide only temporary relief and must be supplemented by preparing the
groundwork for more thorough medium- and long-term corrective actions. The
following recommendations describe a onified, systematic approach to reduc-
ing the impact of false alarms on the aviation community. The initial rec-
' ommendations are designed to lay the groundwork for later strategies by
compiling currently unavailable data required for management decisions. 'he
benefits of these recommendations are summarized in Table 7-1.
Table 7-1. RECOMMENDED SOLUTIONS FOR REDUCING ELT FALSE ALARMS
Activity Benefit*
Review records for defective I
trigger mechanisms Prepare detailed plan Eor
implementing corrective
Survey ELT alarm reports to i
actions
manufacturers
P
Distribute ELT alarm reports Encourage redesign of faulty
to manufacturers units
Reduce false alarms by I0
I percent
". Develop ticketing procedure for
offenders Reduce cost of SAR operations
by I0 percent
". Provide daily reminders to pilots Reduce cost of SAR operations
by 5 percent
,, Encourage pilots to monitor emer- Reduce cost of SAR operations
gency bands by 6 percent
Distribute direction-finding equlp- Reduce cost of SAR operations
_i ment to SAR organizations by b percent "
/ Develop alternative triggering Reduce false alarms by 25
I mechanisms percent
Establish automatic ELT signal Reduce cost of SAR operations
"_ detector and notification capability by 3 percent
' _ at airports I
<'_ Develop and encourage use of standard Reduce cost of SAR operations -
ELT localizing procedure by 3 percent
i*Benefitscalculatedon the basis of sources and causes of ELT trans-
missions and estimated costs of lo,.ating and silencing. 1
• t
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i 7.2.1 Review Service Difficulty. Reports for G-Switch "No Trips"
Many of the false alarms are caused by defective G-sw_tches. Similarly_
many "no trips" also may be related to defective G-switches. Tne Service
I Difficulty Reports have extensive records of inoperative or unreliable ELTs, -usually detected in th course of the annual aircraf inspection. Make arid
model correlation of these records with the false alarm data presented here
I may provide sufficient grounds for recall of specific ELT makes, models, orG-switch types.
7.2.2 Perform Nonrecurring Field Survey
-! The success of some short-term solutions depends on properly approach-
ing the aviation cDmmunity for maximum pilot response. Therefore, before
I any short-term strategies are adopted, it is important to determine pilotttitudes toward usin ELTs and providing a sistance in loca ing alarms.
This goal could be accomplished through a survey of pilots as part of a I_
nonrecurring field sampling and testing program (Plan 3.5).
&
' In addition, such a survey would provide the necessary quantitative
information on the conditions and use patterns of ELTs. This latter infor-
I mation is a critical first step in the decision process to recall certainmakes and models of ELTs for noncompliance.
r One of the corollary benefits of this survey would be the developmentof an acceptabl set of field te t procedures for ELTs. These procedur s
could be applied by certified mechanics to verify proper functioning of
units under Plan 3.7.[
7.2.3 Implement Short-Term Corrective Action Strategy
1 A number of the specific implementation plans contained in the correc-
_ tive action strategy outlined in Chapter Six require very little Government
investment and should begin to show partial results well before 1982, even
'" though "break even" may _ot occur for several years thereafter. Thus it
is highly recommended that the following plans be implemented as rapidly as !4,
possible after review of the Service Difficulty Reports for equipment
I" reliability:
• _ " • Distribute ELT Alarm Reports to manufacturers
_ ;- • Develop nationally uniform nontariff ticketing procedure with man-
I datory corrective action for offenders
• Provide daily reminders of ELT problem to pilots
I" • Encourage pilots to monitor emergency bands before takeoffs and
: _ I after landings
7.2.4 Study Alternative ELT Triggering Mechanisms
Other proposed plans, such as Plan 1.3 (remove defective G-switches)
and Plan 2.9 (specify alternate types of automatic crash sensors for second-
_ . generation ELTs) may require reevaluation of the G-switch concept. This
, 7-3
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Q_
reevaluation may encompass new approaches to achieving the same ends. Con- -:
ventionality must not limit creativity; ideas such as different trdn_mission i
formats, different trigger mechanisms, and certainly some equipment redesigns Qe
must be considered. It is necessary to develop a set of criteria that are
always present in a crash environment and never present otherwise; these _i
c_iteria can constitute the trigger algorithm for a second-generation unit. Q_'
Before the aviation community is once again committed to less than optimum t
approaches and requirements, a creative, unbiased evaluation of the problem -!
e _
, is needed. :!_i
7.2.5 Improve SAR Procedures __
Before more efficient search and rescue operations can be a realits', "_
existing procedures and their faults and benefits must be analyzed in detail
in terms of the need for cost-effectiveness, speed of response, prevention
of future problems, and other similar factors. With this informatlon avail-
able, the impact of any remaining false alarms on SAR can be reduced even
further through adoption of proposed plans, such as Plan 5.1 (automatic
ELT signal detection and notification at airports), Plan 5.2 (distribute&
DFs to SAR organizations for more extensive use during SAR operations),
and Plan 5.4 (develop "model" SAR procedures for national use that illus- '
trate optimum ap. :oaches to locating and silencing ELTs).
f
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